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Meditation-induced bliss viewed as release from conditioned neural
(thought) patterns that block reward signals in the brain pleasure center
Patricia E. Sharp*
Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH, USA
The nucleus accumbens orchestrates processes related to reward and pleasure,
including the addictive consequences of repeated reward (e.g., drug addiction and
compulsive gambling) and the accompanying feelings of craving and anhedonia.
The neurotransmitters dopamine and endogenous opiates play interactive roles in
these processes. They are released by natural rewards (i.e., food, water, sex, money,
play, etc.) and are released or mimicked by drugs of abuse. Repeated drug use
induces conditioned down-regulation of these neurotransmitters, thus causing
painful suppression of everyday pleasure. As with many spiritual traditions,
Buddhism provides strong advice against the pursuit of worldly pleasures to
attain the ‘‘good life.’’ In contrast, many forms of meditation give rise to an
immense and abiding joy. Most of these practices involve ‘‘stilling the mind,’’
whereby all content-laden thought (e.g., fantasies, daydreams, plans) ceases, and
the mind enters a state of openness, formlessness, clarity, and bliss. This can be
explained by the Buddhist suggestion that almost all of our everyday thoughts are
a form of addiction. It follows that if we turn off this internal ‘‘gossip of ego,’’ we
will find relief from the biochemical dopamine/opiate down-regulation, which is,
perhaps, the perpetual concomitant of our daily rumination.
Keywords: bliss; Buddhism; default mode network; dopamine; meditation; nucleus
accumbens; mind wandering; prediction error
Meditation-induced bliss results (in part) from clearing the mind of discursive thoughts
With the stilling of thought and examination, he enters and abides in the second jhana
[which is characterized by] rapture and pleasure born of concentration, and accompanied
by inner composure and singleness of mind, without thought and examination. (The Pali
Sutras, as quoted in Shankman, 2008, p. 43)
The above quote describes a state of extreme positive affect, which can be reached by
adept practitioners of Buddhist meditation upon entering a state of deep, meditative
concentration known as Samadhi (Shankman, 2008). This state initially involves
clearing the mind of its usual routine thoughts, which are often repetitive and
discursive. Calming the mind in this way often involves fixed concentration on an
object, such as the meditator’s own breath, or perhaps a basic element or color. As
everyday thoughts subside, a state of philosophical examination follows, perhaps
over the nature of thought itself. Eventually, this examination stills and gives way to
the feeling of bliss, as described in the quote above. This blissful state not only fills
the mind but reportedly extends throughout the body as well. Thus, according to the
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sutras: ‘‘He makes the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion drench, fill, and
pervade this body, so that there is no part of his whole body unpervaded by the
rapture and pleasure born of seclusion’’ (Shankman, 2008, p. 37).
According to traditional descriptions of meditation, this state can deepen even
further and last for many hours, thus offering a continuous state of positive affect
that, interestingly, lasts longer than mundane pleasurable states such as those
induced by food, orgasm, or drugs. It should be noted that this blissful state is
eventually replaced by an even deeper absorptive state*the fourth jhana*that is
beyond pleasure and pain, whereby ‘‘He sits pervading this body with a pure, bright
mind . . . ’’ (Shankman, 2008, p. 48).
As outlined elsewhere (Wallace, 2009), many religious and philosophical
traditions throughout the world have discovered similar states of calm, meditative
concentration that can give rise to states of heightened positive affect.
Bliss induced through meditation may share common neural/biochemical processes with
everyday pleasures such as sex, drugs, and food
The nucleus accumbens is thought to be centrally involved in the generation of pleasure,
regardless of the source of that pleasure
As will be elaborated throughout this paper, the brain region known as the
nucleus accumbens (Figures 1 and 2), along with certain anatomically connected
regions, is thought by many neuroscientists to constitute one of the main
‘‘pleasure centers’’ in the brain. It seems that the accumbens is centrally involved
in orchestrating both subjective and behavioral aspects of pleasure and reward,
regardless of the nature of the inducing stimulus (e.g., food, water, sex, drugs,
monetary reward, social reward, etc.). This suggests that joyful states induced
through contemplative practices may also be dependent on these accumbens-related
processes.
Certain meditative practices share subjective and physiological components with those
involved in sexual arousal and orgasm, suggesting a common neural substrate in the
nucleus accumbens
Similar to the concentration of Samadhi, there are numerous Buddhist and Yogic
practices that involve calming the mind through meditation (i.e., clearing the mind of
its usual repetitive thought patterns), from which practitioners report an attendant
bliss that pervades both mind and body.
Interestingly, certain of these blissful experiences involve a clear and acknowl-
edged overlap with bodily regions and sensations that are related to sexual
pleasure. For example, the Tantric Buddhist practice of Tummo*or ‘‘Inner
Fire’’*involves the visualization of certain Yogic channels and chakras, as
described by Lama Thubten Yeshe (1998). In particular, the practice focuses
strongly on the naval chakra, located four finger-widths below the navel. The
Tummo visualization involves pulling energy down into this region while inhaling,
while imagining that doing so generates intense heat at the chakra. Upon exhaling,
the heated energy is said to shoot up through the central channel and gradually
grows stronger (over repeated exhalations) until it reaches the crown chakra,
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located in the head. As the practice ensues, substantial temperature increases are
actually generated within the body (see Benson et al., 1982), which provide the
practitioner with the remarkable ability to stay warm even in extremely frigid
conditions (David-Neel, 1932).
More relevant for the present context, however, is that the practice is said to
result in the eventual ‘‘awakening of kundalini,’’ whereby bliss rises into the body’s
central channel and through the higher chakras, which are said to contribute to
developing the experience of bliss. Upon reaching the crown chakra, intense bliss is
said to be fully energized and to flow back down through the central channel and
throughout the body.
According to traditional descriptions, ‘‘ordinary people’’ who are not Tantric
practitioners can nevertheless experience the melting of Kundalini during normal
sexual orgasm. In fact, responses similar to orgasm can also result from the Tummo
practice described above. However, practitioners are warned against allowing this
‘‘uncontrolled Kundalini’’ to arise, since it results in an ultimate loss of Kundalini
energy. Moreover, it ultimately continues the painful cycle of desire and release (i.e.,
Samsara). Thus, male practitioners are advised that losing a few drops of semen
during Tummo practice is not a problem, but arising to full orgasm should be
avoided (Yeshe, 1998, pp. 147150).
As is well known within biological science, ordinary sexual pleasure involves not
only the genital and reproductive organs, but also brain regions related to subjective
pleasure. As already noted, the nucleus accumbens has been the focus of interest as a
possible locus for this pleasure. As described above, the Tummo bliss (viz., the
awakening of Kundalini) also centers on more than one bodily region. Two of these
seem to correspond to anatomical areas identified by western biological science: (1)
the naval chakra located in or near the reproductive organs; and (2) the crown chakra
located in the head.
Across different Buddhist teachers and practices, there is variability concerning
the precise location of the crown chakra. However, some descriptions seem to
place the crown chakra in a location that coincides with the nucleus accumbens
(see Figure 1). Consider the following discussion of this point from Lama Yeshe’s
teaching on the Tummo practice:
There are doubts about the location of the crown chakra, which is also called the bliss
chakra. Literally, ‘‘crown’’ refers to the top of the head; therefore, the crown chakra is
sometimes said to be between the skin and the skull at the top of the head. In my
opinion, however, the chakra is in the brain, where there is much active energy. This is
where the bliss center is located. Some texts call this the head chakra, but we could
also call it the brain chakra. In any case, visualize this chakra somewhere between your
eyebrows and your crown, at a point more toward the back of the head . . . (Yeshe,
1998, p. 107)
This seems to open the extremely speculative possibility that the ancient Vedic and
Buddhist traditions may have developed meditative methods to tap into the
pleasure and biochemical possibilities provided by the accumbens. It is also
possible that the ancient practitioners were somehow able to detect the location of
this activity. Indeed, Lama Yeshe (1998, p. 107) asserts that practitioners can
gradually discover the exact locations of each chakra for themselves, as a result of
their practice.
Religion, Brain & Behavior 3
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Drug-induced euphoria is sometimes described as being similar to orgasm, and is
thought to depend (in part) on biochemical activity in the accumbens
I was scared to main, but I gave in, Pudgy hit it in for me. I did half a fiver and, shit,
what a rush . . . just one long heat wave all through my body, any ache I had flushed out.
You can never top that first rush, it’s like ten orgasms . . . (Carroll, 1987, p. 30)
This quote provides a description of a heroin-induced high. As with Tummo
practice, Carroll describes a subjective state of bliss, which apparently has marked
similarities to that of sexual orgasm, even though it was not induced through any
overt or otherwise obvious sexual activity.
Most drugs of abuse are thought to work, in part, by activating dopamine and/or
opiate systems within the region of the nucleus accumbens, and possibly also related
structures. In some cases, the drug may act by directly causing increased levels of
dopamine and/or opiates within the nucleus accumbens itself. In other cases, a drug
may act indirectly at a more remote site. For example, opiate drugs have been shown to
cause dopamine release within the accumbens indirectly, by inhibiting GABAergic
interneurons in the midbrain. In turn, these interneurons exert an inhibitory influence
on dopamine neurons in the ventral tegmental area, which project to the accumbens
(Johnson & North, 1992).
This dopamine/opiate activation is thought to initiate a series of biochemical
events in the accumbens region, which orchestrates both reward learning (in this
case, reward for drug seeking and drug using) and a subjective ‘‘high.’’ These
accumbens transmitter systems are also activated during sexual foreplay and
A B
  Nucleus
accumbens
Figure 1. Illustrations of the location of the nucleus accumbens.
Note: The nucleus accumbens is thought to be a major center for the generation of positive
hedonic (pleasure) states. (A) Here is shown a mid-sagital view. (B) Here is an additional view,
which also indicates some of the accumbens’ connections with other brain regions. As
described in the text, the location of the accumbens seems to correspond well with at least
some descriptions of the location of the crown (bliss) chakra within the Tantric tradition.
BLAbasolateral amygdala; mPFCmedial prefrontal cortex; NAcnucleus accumbens;
VTAventral tegmental area (the location of dopaminergic cells).
Source (B): Reprinted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Nature Neuroscience,
Schoenbaum, Stalnaker, & Shaham, 2007.
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especially at the moment of orgasm, which perhaps explains the similarity between
sexual pleasure and certain drug-induced experiences.
Critical differences between meditative and ‘‘worldly’’ pleasures: meditation does not
seem to initiate conditioned down-regulation of either the positive affective states or the
correlated biochemical brain activities as a result of repeated exposure
The experiences quoted above suggest that religious states of transcendent bliss may
be similar to the subjective experiences of pleasure induced by wordly pleasures such
as food, sex, and drugs. They further suggest that religiously evoked states of bliss
may somehow be related to biochemical changes similar to those induced by these
worldly pursuits (Linden, 2011, p. 159). Indeed, the one study (to my knowledge)
to examine brain dopamine levels during meditation (Kjaer et al., 2002) has
demonstrated that advanced practitioners experience a large increase in dopamine
levels (65%) in the nucleus accumbens during meditative states.
However, there are major differences between contemplatively induced bliss and
that derived from worldly pursuits. First, repeated experience with the same external
reward (e.g., food, drugs, money, etc.) within a given context typically leads to a
reduction in the level of pleasure induced over the course of repeated exposures (e.g.,
see Hyman, Malenka, & Nestler, 2006). In other words, exposure leads to tolerance
for the euphoric effect.
Interestingly, many drug-related forms of tolerance are associative (i.e., learned)
in nature, such that they appear dependent on contextual cues present during
exposure (see Hyman et al., 2006; Siegel, Baptista, Kim, McDonald, & Weise-Kelly,
2000). For example, when repeated morphine injections are paired with a predictive
audiovisual cue, subsequent presentations of the cue cause greater morphine
tolerance in conditioned individuals than in those who received the same number
of morphine injections in the absence of the cue (Siegel et al., 2000).
Investigations of the biochemical effects caused by chronic drug use have revealed
numerous compensatory changes in affective brain systems, including the nucleus
accumbens and the extended amygdala. It is likely that these effects combine to cause
the exposure-induced loss of the hedonic response. Of particular relevance here is
that the down-regulation of hedonic effects, which results from repeated exposure,
corresponds to the conditioned suppression of dopamine caused by worldly rewards
(Schultz, 1998).
In contrast, the ability to induce blissful states via meditative techniques
(as opposed to worldly vices) appears to increase over repeated efforts. Thus, long-
term and devoted practitioners tend to improve in this ability over time. Also, the fact
that Kjaer et al. (2002) find high dopamine levels in long-time practitioners suggests
that dopamine release remains intact (or increases) with repeated exposure to the
meditative practice.
A proposed mechanism for how clearing the mind leads to subjective bliss
In what follows, I will propose a theory for how these spiritually induced states of
positive affect generate dopamine/opiate activity in the accumbens, and yet are not
accompanied by the typical dysphoric consequences of repeated exposure to more
worldly pleasures. Centrally, this will include an explanation for why these blissful
states are induced by clearing the mind of its usual thought patterns. Specifically,
Religion, Brain & Behavior 5
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I suggest that enduring meditative bliss may result, at least in part, from the release
of conditioned dopamine suppression, which often accompanies daily life. In
particular, I will propose that the human tendency toward repetitive, compulsive
thought patterns (i.e., daydreams, fantasies, and obsessions) may constitute an
internal form of reward. They are addictive ‘‘behaviors’’ that may be shaped by the
same mechanisms that shape behaviorally exhibited addictions. As such, they may
come to down-regulate dopamine release into the nucleus accumbens and thus
maintain an ongoing state of relative dysphoria.
The proposed mechanism will take the form of a neural network model that
incorporates the idea of reward prediction error, as exemplified by traditional
learning theory (see Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) and subsequent models of
reinforcement learning (e.g., Hazy, Frank, & O’Reilly, 2010). This earlier work,
conducted in the context of animal conditioning, provided compelling evidence that
conditioned cues not only come to predict a given reward, but also to block the
reinforcement signal otherwise provided by that reward. For example, when a tone
becomes a robust predictor of food reward (as evidenced by the animal’s conditioned
salivation), it will subsequently block the animal’s ability to learn another stimulus-
response association (Kamin, 1968).
In the original Rescorla-Wagner (1972) theory, the reinforcement signal was a
strictly theoretical entity proposed to ‘‘stamp in’’ the associative connection between
the conditioned stimulus (e.g., tone) and the unconditioned stimulus (e.g., food).
However, a remarkable biological parallel has recently been discovered in the activity
patterns of midbrain dopamine cells over the course of conditioning (see Schultz,
1998). Specifically, these cells fire strongly and preferentially in response to hedonically
positive stimuli, such as food or juice (Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1996). Thus, during
initial conditioning trials with food reward, these cells fire robustly in response to the
food delivery. However, this response gradually diminishes over the conditioning trials:
once the food comes to be well predicted by the conditioned stimulus, there is no
longer a response to the food by dopamine cells. These findings have led to the idea
that dopamine may, in fact, constitute the theoretical reinforcement signal postulated
by several theorists (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Sutton & Barto, 1998).
If it is true that these reward-related dopamine signals are also causally related to
the subjective pleasure provided by worldly rewards, then the findings from
Mirenowicz and Schultz (1996; Schultz, 1998) may provide at least part of the
explanation for why worldly attainments inevitably lose their subjective pleasure.
Further, if it is true that our compulsive, everyday thought patterns are also a
form of repetitive, predictable, and rewarded behavior, they may also lose their ability
to provide the rewards that initially supported their development. In fact, to the
extent that they are a constant concomitant to our mental life, they may constitute a
continuous suppression of dopamine-related activity in the accumbens.
Anatomical overview of the nucleus accumbens and its connections
Information from cortical regions is filtered through the accumbens and ultimately back
onto prefrontal motor regions of the cortex
The nucleus accumbens (along with a portion of the olfactory tubercle) is thought to
comprise the ventral portion of a larger structure known as the striatum (Heimer
et al., 1982). As indicated in Figure 2, the striatum as a whole receives inputs from
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nearly all cortical regions (Graybiel, 2008; Parent & Hazrati, 1995; Voorn et al.,
2004). In turn, it sends indirect projections back to motor areas in the frontal and
pre-frontal cortical regions, via a series of synaptic relays through the pallidum,
subthalamic nucleus (not shown in Figure 2), and thalamus (Alexander & Crutcher,
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Figure 2. A highly schematized and simplified diagram of portions of the striato-pallidal
circuitry.
Note: The striatum and pallidum are shown in purple, while the midbrain ventral tegmental
area is shown in light green. The topographically organized projections that form cortico
striatalpallidalthalamocortical loops are shown separated into a dorsal (blue arrows) and a
ventral (red arrows) division. The dorsal loop includes information from sensorimotor and
associative cortices that projects onto the caudate-putamen nucleus (dorsal striatum), then
onto portions of the globus pallidus (dorsal pallidum), and then through the ventral anterior
(VA) and ventral lateral (VL) thalamic nuclei and back onto the motor cortex. The ventral, or
limbic, loop includes information from medial prefrontal, hippocampal, insular, anterior
cingulate, and amygdalar regions, which projects onto the ventral striatum (nucleus
accumbens), then onto the ventral pallidum, and then via the dorsomedial thalamic nucleus
onto several prefrontal (executive motor cortex/working memory) and anterior cingulate
cortical regions.
Source: Based on Heimer, Switzer, and Van Hoesen (1982); Graybiel (2008), and Voorn,
Vanderschuren, Groenewegen, Robbins, and Pennartz (2004).
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1990; Gerfen, 1992; Parent, 1990; Parent & Hazrati, 1995). In this way, cortical
information is filtered through a corticostriatalpallidalthalamocortical loop in
order to ultimately influence behavior via the frontal cortices.
The entire striatum (dorsal and ventral), along with its associated regions, is
thought to be involved in reward learning and hedonic tone. However, the nucleus
accumbens in particular has received the most attention in relation to the obviously
pleasure-related instrumental responses, addictions, compulsions, and obsessions.
The nucleus accumbens receives input from cortical regions implicated in the production
of ‘‘offline’’ mental events such as daydreams and fantasies
The nucleus accumbens, in particular, receives input from limbic cortical regions
thought to be involved in emotional processing and certain mnemonic functions.
These include three regions: (1) the hippocampal area; (2) medial and orbitofrontal
portions of the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate; and (3) the basolateral
amygdala (see Pennartz, Groenewegen, & Lopes da Silva, 1994; Voorn et al., 2004).
Of particular importance here is that both the medial prefrontal and the
hippocampal regions are critical nodes in the so-called ‘‘default mode network’’
(DMN) (see Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). This network refers to a
set of interconnected associative cortical regions, including the ventral and dorsal
medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, the inferior
parietal lobule, lateral temporal cortex, and the hippocampal formation (Buckner et
al., 2008).
The DMN was initially identified accidentally in the midst of technical concerns
related to how best to choose a control condition when conducting brain-imaging
studies. Many early imaging studies included a control condition that simply
involved ‘‘rest’’ (i.e., undirected mental activity). This rest state was intended to
provide a backdrop of relatively low overall brain activity against which to assess
activity induced during particular sensory and cognitive tasks. However, careful
examination revealed that these rest times consistently involved elevated activity in a
correlated set of three regions (listed above), which then became selectively
deactivated during experimental task performance (Buckner et al., 2008).
Since this network was initially identified as being involved in rest states that did
not include the experimental task itself, it was named DMN, meaning it is the state
that the brain enters ‘‘by default’’ when no explicit externally driven cognition is
required. However, subsequent work on this system has shown that it is actively
involved in self-referential mental activities (that arise spontaneously during ‘‘rest’’
periods), which are commonly involved in daydreaming, fantasizing, and planning
(e.g., Mason et al., 2007; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010).
In particular, the hippocampal and parahippocampal portions of the default
network are thought to help orchestrate the mental ‘‘time travel’’ abilities (Schacter &
Addis, 2009; Tulving, 1985) involved in episodic memory and the construction of
possible future scenarios. Thus, the accumbens appears to receive ongoing neural
activity patterns that constitute the neural code for daydreams, fantasies, and planning.
Midbrain dopaminergic cells also converge onto the accumbens cells
Along with the cortical inputs described above, dopaminergic cells from the ventral
tegmental area, medial substantia nigra, and pars compacta converge onto the
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projection cells of the accumbens (see Joel & Weiner, 2000). These dopaminergic cells
are critical for the central hypothesis being presented here for the following reasons.
First, dopamine release from these cells is thought to be related to subjective hedonic
states. Second, activity in these cells is also strongly implicated as being critical for
reward learning observed at the behavioral level. Finally, the dopamine activity itself
is down-regulated over the course of repeated conditioning trials (as mentioned
above).
The nucleus accumbens contains endogenous opiates
One striking aspect of the striatum is the fact that it contains a rich variety of
neuropeptides and other neurochemical transmitters and receptors, many of which
are involved in emotional responses related to euphoria, mating, social bonding, and
trust (Herkenham, 1992; Lim & Young, 2006; Mailleux & Vanderhaegen, 1992;
Parent & Hazrati, 1995; Pennartz et al., 1994). Of particular relevance here (see
Figure 3) is that many of the accumbens neurons themselves manufacture and release
endogenous opiates as one of their neurotransmitters (Gerfen, 1992; Voorn, Gerfen, &
Groenewegen, 1989).
The nucleus accumbens and positive affect
Dopamine and positive affect
Several lines of evidence suggest that dopamine release in the accumbens is causally
related to euphoria and positive mood. First, all drugs of abuse lead to the release of
dopamine in striatal regions (Hyman et al., 2006; Koob & Volkow, 2010), and these
drugs are of course typically associated with euphoric or mood-elevating effects
(e.g., Hyman & Nestler, 1996). Thus, the various drugs of abuse (viz., cocaine, heroin,
alcohol, nicotine, etc.) are quite heterogeneous in terms of molecular structure and
their initial chemical target(s) within the brain; yet they all*either directly or
indirectly*cause dopamine release into the accumbens. This suggests the possibility
that such dopamine release may be the common factor in the ability of these various
drugs to induce positive hedonic effects.
In addition, natural rewards also cause dopamine release into the accumbens. For
example, research suggests that dopamine neurons fire preferentially to appetitive
stimuli, such as food and juice, as well as to conditioned predictors of these natural
rewards (Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1996; Schultz, 1998). Similarly, in vivo microdialysis
and electrochemistry have confirmed that dopamine levels are elevated during
presentations of food and/or conditioned predictors of food delivery (see Berridge &
Robinson, 1998).
Another natural reward that induces dopamine release in the accumbens is
stimuli and behavior related to sexual activity. For example, Fiorino, Coury, and
Phillips (1997) discovered the following. When male rats were allowed to view a
receptive female rat from behind a screen, they experienced an increase in accumbens
dopamine levels. Following this introductory period, the male rat was allowed access
to the female and copulation ensued, which caused a further dramatic increase in
dopamine levels. In the following period of sexual satiety, dopamine levels returned
to baseline; but in a subsequent manipulation, a new receptive female was presented
behind the screen, and this resulted in a slight increase in dopamine levels, so that
Religion, Brain & Behavior 9
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they were again above baseline. Upon removal of the screen, copulation ensued with
the new female, which caused a concomitant and renewed spike in dopamine levels.
Although technically challenging, studies of this kind have also been conducted
using human subjects. For example, Holstege et al. (2003) conducted an experiment
in which regional brain activity levels were examined as human males received genital
stimulation to the point of ejaculation from their sexual partner. The single most
intense area of elevated brain activity during the moment of ejaculation was the
mesodiencephalic transition zone, which includes the ventral tegmental area. This is
the area containing the dopaminergic neurons that project to the accumbens. Thus,
research on both humans and animals suggests that there is intense dopamine release
in the accumbens during sexual climax.
Opiates
GABA
Glutamate
Dopamine
Cortical glutamate cells
(prefrontal, hippocampus,
amygdala)
 Projection cells
(ACCUMBENS)
Dopamine cells
in ventral tegmental
area (MIDBRAIN)
Figure 3. A schematic view of the medium spiny projection neurons that constitute the main
cell type within the accumbens.
Note: Also shown are glutamatergic inputs from cortical regions such as the prefrontal and
hippocampal areas, as well as inputs from midbrain dopaminergic neurons. The medium spiny
cells use the inhibitory transmitter GABA for synaptic communication, and many also release
a co-transmitter. This figure depicts a set of medium spiny cells that co-release GABA and
endogenous opiates.
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Finally, it has been suggested that a chronic down-regulation of dopaminergic
levels in the nucleus accumbens may play a role in the anhedonia associated with
depression (see Nestler & Carlezon, 2006).
Endogenous opiates and positive affect
The above quote from Carroll (1987) attests to the euphoric effects of opiate-like
drugs. As is well known, the brain produces its own opiate-like substances, as well as
receptors with which these endogenous opiates interact. It is these same receptors
that also interact with exogenous opiate drugs, such as morphine and heroin, to
produce their various physiological and subjective effects. One type of cell that
utilizes these endogenous opiates is the projection cells. These cells group together in
the striatum, including those in the accumbens (Gerfen, 1992; Voorn et al., 1989).
As suggested in Figure 3, the opiate and dopaminergic systems are closely
intermixed within the circuitry of the accumbens. For example, dopaminergic inputs
play a powerful role in influencing the firing rate of the accumbens neurons (Sesack &
Grace, 2010). This in turn suggests that dopamine plays a role in controlling the
release of endogenous opiates into the accumbens via the intrinsic feedback
projections from accumbens neurons. It is worth noting that this suggestion has
been supported empirically (e.g., Llorens-Cortes, Zini, Gros, & Schwartz, 1991).
Thus, three inferences can be made: dopamine and endogenous opiates are both
located in the accumbens, they have both been implicated in the production of
positive hedonic states, and they are released interactively. This situation has led to a
great deal of controversy as to which of the two neurotransmitters may be most
directly responsible for the euphoric reactions caused by exogenous substances, such
as opiates (e.g., heroin and morphine) and dopaminergic agonists (e.g., amphetamine
and cocaine) (Berridge, 2007; Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Wise 2004, 2008).
It is beyond the scope of the current paper to address this issue. However, for the
present purposes, it is sufficient to suggest that euphoric effects are likely due to some
unknown details of neurochemical events. Under normal circumstances, these are
likely caused by interactions involving dopamine and endogenous opiates, as well as
additional mechanisms. Of course, the precise neural correlates*perhaps causes*of
subjectively experienced emotions are unknown. This mystery is partially due to the
larger mystery of consciousness; namely that science lacks fundamental principles to
relate inner conscious experience to neural activity. Indeed, this issue corresponds to
the ‘‘hard problem’’ of consciousness: relating consciousness to the brain (Chalmers,
1996).
However, the data reviewed in this section suggest that cellular processes within
the accumbens somehow allow for neurochemical activity, which, at the subjective
level, corresponds to various aspects of euphoria, pleasure, satisfaction, satiety, and
so forth.
In addition to orchestrating subjective hedonic responses to stimuli, the nucleus
accumbens also seems to orchestrate reward learning in relation to these positive stimuli
It is often assumed that events that give rise to positive subjective experiences also
serve as reinforcers for behaviors that lead to their occurrence. For example, when we
use food to help train a dog, there is often the assumption that the dog subjectively
enjoys the food and also will have an increased likelihood of engaging in any
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behavior that is quickly followed by food. On the theoretical level, the food serves as
a ‘‘stamp’’ (Thorndike, 1911), which strengthens the connection between the stimulus
context (i.e., the training environment and the trainer’s commands) and the dog’s
behavior.
The anatomy of the striatum (Figures 2 and 3) suggests that its structure is well
suited to serve as the region in which environmental stimulus representations
converge onto cells that guide behavior. Thus, stimulus-related activity in the
prefrontal, hippocampal, and amygdalar regions converges onto the striatal neurons,
which ultimately project signals back onto motor response regions in the cortex.
Evidence that dopamine release in the striatum serves as a reinforcer
There is a great deal of evidence indicating that the striatum*in general*and the
nucleus accumbens*in particular*are critical for orchestrating reward learning,
whether it is for natural rewards or drugs of addiction. Much of this work further
suggests that dopamine release into the accumbens is a critical step in the rein-
forcement process. These ideas have been reviewed extensively (see Berridge &
Robinson, 1998; Graybiel, 2008; Hyman et al., 2006; Koob & LeMoal 2008; Koob &
Volkow, 2010; Packard & McGaugh, 1996; Schultz, 1998; Wise, 2004, 2008).
As already mentioned, all drugs of abuse and natural rewards cause an increase in
accumbens dopamine levels, at least during initial presentations. In addition,
conditioned and social rewards, such as money, social approval, or scoring points
in a game, also cause the release of dopamine into the accumbens (see Linden, 2011).
All these events can serve as reinforcers, since individuals will learn how to obtain
these rewards.
Evidence that dopamine within the accumbens specifically can serve as a reinforcer is
provided by the fact that animals will learn to work (e.g., press a lever) in order to obtain
micro-injections of dopamine agonists into the accumbens itself. This supports the idea
that dopamine in the accumbens may serve as Thorndike’s biochemical ‘‘stamp,’’ which
strengthens the connection between stimulus and response representations.
Theoretical models for reinforcement learning in the striatum often involve dopamine-
dependent strengthening of stimulusresponse connections
Figure 4 provides a schematic representation of the postulated sequence of events for
the neural circuitry of accumbens-based reward learning. The ideas represented here
are compatible with a number of previously developed learning models, and are most
closely based on the work of Hazy et al. (2010) and O’Reilly and Frank (2006).
Initially, during the process of development there are connections made from
limbic cortical regions onto the accumbens cells; but the exact strengths of these
numerous cortico-accumbens connections are initially random (Figure 4A). Note
that any accumbens cell that happens to fire will play a role in determining the
ongoing stream of behavior via projections to the motor cortex, as discussed above.
Since the connections are random in strength during development, there are
initially no strong (i.e., compulsive) tendencies for certain accumbens cells to fire in
the presence of particular contexts or stimuli. For example, during childhood there is
no particular tendency for the sight of a whiskey bottle to prompt approach and
consumption, or for the slot machine to evoke the afforded gambling activity.
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Figure 4. Schematic depiction of the postulated events involved in the development of the
pattern of synaptic weights between the cortical and accumbens cells.
Note: The reward (dopamine)-induced strengthening of recently active synapses causes the
emergence of stimulusresponse habits at the behavioral level, as described in the text.
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However, at some point in life the individual may be prompted to take a drink
from the bottle, purchase drugs from the dealer, or play the slot machine. If it
happens that this stimulusresponse event is quickly followed by a surge of
dopamine release (Figure 4B) into the nucleus accumbens (which is likely given
the tendency for such stimuli to cause dopaminergic activity), then the stimuli will
strengthen any recently active cortico-accumbens connections. Each of these training
experiences causes long-lasting strengthening of the involved synapses (Figure 4C).
It is hypothesized that throughout the course of one’s lifetime, many different
stimulusresponse configurations are shaped in this way, such that the individual
comes to have a wide repertoire of conditioned response tendencies. These tendencies
are orchestrated by the many cortico-accumbens loops that are formed in relation to
the various contexts and stimuli afforded by their environment.
Predicted rewards lose the ability to cause dopamine release and subjective hedonic
effects
The learning mechanisms depicted in Figure 4 suggest that we should be able to
generate endless happiness through instrumental learning of successful responses for
each behavioral context
Figure 4 represents how the nucleus accumbens may work to orchestrate the
development of maladaptive behavioral compulsions, such as drug, alcohol, and
gambling addictions. Of course, it is assumed that these instrumental-learning
mechanisms evolved within the animal kingdom long before the appearance of
human vices. In this context, it is also assumed that these mechanisms are of
tremendous value in relation to the survival of the individual. So, these learning
processes would, presumably, provide a rich repertoire of behavioral knowledge
related to which affordances are appropriate*such as foods, drinking sources,
sources of warmth, social comfort, bonding, and so on*and which are likely to be
successful in the different times and places experienced by the animal.
The fact that these reinforcing (i.e., dopaminergic) events within the accumbens
also seem to be associated with subjective pleasure would seem to bode well for the
subjective happiness of the individual. This arrangement suggests that, given a series
of fortunate learning opportunities, the individual could develop a large set of
context-specific behaviors that would lead to beneficial effects at the biological level,
and would also cause contentment and joy at the subjective level. In fact, the
mechanisms (see Figure 4) suggest that as we go along in life, we are likely to become
increasingly skilled at obtaining the ‘‘good things’’ in life, and will also become
increasingly ‘‘happy’’ in a parallel fashion. Given that even abstract rewards, such as
money, social approval, winning points in a game, and so forth, can activate the
dopamine system, it seems that there would be no limit to the happiness we could
have, provided that we develop the ability to earn large amounts of money, fame,
power, and so on.
However, it is almost a truism that our hedonic well-being does not necessarily
parallel our objective financial or social status (within certain limits). Thus, given a
certain basic level of safety and nourishment, happiness does not necessarily increase
with additional success. Many have documented the ‘‘hedonic treadmill’’ effect in
which worldly success only enhances the longing to gain even more worldly goods
(see Compton & Hoffman, 2013).
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Of course, this inability to find abiding happiness through the pursuit of worldly
attainments is not only a recognized phenomenon within the psychological literature,
but also the standard advice offered by many religious, spiritual, and humanist
traditions. In short, the fact that money cannot buy happiness seems to be discovered
again and again by different cultures, and by many individuals over the course of
their lifetime.
The ancient Buddhist and Yogic traditions are among those that warn against the
dangers of attempting to find happiness through worldly attainments. They, too,
warn of the endless craving and dissatisfaction that ultimately result from this
approach. Instead, they recommend a path of renunciation in which all pursuit of
worldly pleasures is abandoned.
There are learning mechanisms within the accumbens that provide a conditioned down-
regulation of dopamine release for predicted rewards
This aspect of the human condition suggests that the biochemical events induced by
worldly gains and orchestrated by inner pleasure must somehow be suppressed or
down-regulated in response to repeated reward acquisition.
Indeed, the study of brain mechanisms related to drug addiction has revealed a
variety of compensatory mechanisms that are induced by repeated drug exposure.
These changes purportedly explain the spectrum of behavioral and subjective
changes involved with the development of addiction and craving, including the
fact that chronic drug abusers may no longer experience the ‘‘high’’ that the drug
originally provided.
One set of results in this area has to do with studies examining the reward-related
activity of dopaminergic neurons over the course of various Pavlovian and
instrumental conditioning paradigms involving a food reward (see Schultz, 1998).
As already discussed, this work has revealed that the ventral tegmental and
substantia nigra dopaminergic neurons exhibit a reward-prediction error similar to
that postulated by Rescorla and Wagner (1972) and based on earlier work in animal
conditioning.
It should be noted that the error-prediction view of dopaminergic function
provided by the work of Schultz (1998) is not the only function that has been
postulated for the dopaminergic system. For example, Panksepp (1998) has
suggested that dopamine is part of a more general ‘‘seeking’’ system that is involved
with reward anticipation and motivates animals to forage and thereby find rewards.
A similar view is that the dopamine system provides incentive salience and
motivation (Berridge, 2007; Berridge & Robinson, 1998). Although a review of
these issues is beyond the scope of the present paper, it seems possible that the
postulated reward-prediction error and hypotheses concerning seeking and incentive
motivations are not mutually incompatible. Rather, they may be complimentary and
related functions all of which are supported by the dopamine system.
A study along these lines is reported by Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, (1997) and
depicted schematically in Figure 5. Here, animals are presented with conditioning
trials in which an initially neutral stimulus (viz., a light) is paired with delivery of an
appetitive stimulus (viz., juice). During initial learning trials on this task, delivery of
the juice reward caused an expected short-latency burst of dopamine cell activity
(Figure 5, left panel).
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However, as the training continued and the reward delivery became predictable to
the animal, the dopamine release at the time of reward gradually diminished (Figure 5,
middle panel). This dopamine suppression was based on an associative learning
process, as evidenced by the fact that unpredicted food delivery still resulted in
vigorous dopamine cell bursting (data not shown). As also indicated in Figure 5
(middle panel), a brief dopamine burst to the conditioned (light) stimulus developed
as learning progressed. Thus, dopaminergic release into the accumbens moved from
the time of reward to the time of the conditioned stimulus presentation.
Finally, with even more learning trials (Figure 5, right panel), even the dopamine
response to the light began to diminish. In the end, the animal still performed the
instrumental response to receive juice each time the light was presented, but this now
took place in the absence of any appreciable dopamine release.
There are numerous neural network models that have been developed to account
for the observed down-regulation of dopamine to the unconditioned stimulus, and
also the development of the dopaminergic response to the conditioned stimulus. One
of these proposed mechanisms (Hazy et al., 2010) is partially depicted in Figure 6.
Here, a subset of the accumbens cells, consisting of so-called patch-like cells, is
postulated to be responsible for the conditioned suppression of dopamine neuron
responses that develops under the influence of the unconditioned stimulus. These
patch cells are thought to undergo the development of conditioned enhancement of
their response to the light conditioned stimulus (CS), just as do the other (matrix)
accumbens cells (see Figure 6). However, in the case of patch cells, rather than
providing an influence on behavioral output (as matrix cells do), the patch cells
project back onto the midbrain dopamine cells. Since the accumbens cells use an
inhibitory transmitter, this patch cell conditioning constitutes a conditioned
Light CS
Food US
Dopamine
Early trials Later trials Overlearning
Figure 5. Representation of midbrain dopamine cell firing patterns over the course of
conditioning trials.
Note: Each of the left, middle and right panels depicts a representative training trial, in which the
light conditioning stimulus (CS) is presented briefly, and is followed by presentation of a food
reward (unconditioned stimulus: US), contingent on an instrumental response. As shown in the
left panel, during early trials, the food US causes a burst of activity in the dopaminergic cells.
This is because the food is not yet predictable for the subject. The middle panel depicts trials later
in conditioning, when the animal has learned that the light CS predicts the arrival of the food.
Since the food presentation is now predictable for the subject, there is no longer a dopamine
response at the time of food delivery. Note, however, that the light has come to elicit a dopamine
cell burst. Finally, following many additional training trials (right panel) the dopamine response
to the light also fades away, so that there is no dopamine cell bursting at any point during the
trial, even though the animal continues to touch the lever in order to obtain the juice.
Source: Based on data reviewed in Schultz et al. (1997, 1998).
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suppression of the dopamine signal (i.e., learning). This component of the dopamine-
induced plasticity thus serves to turn off the dopamine-learning signal.
To the extent that phasic dopamine release is causally related to biochemical
states that provide subjective pleasure, it appears that predicted rewards become less
capable of evoking pleasure over repeated trials. Thus, in the advanced stages of
developing a conditioned reward behavior, the individual is left with a strong
behavioral compulsion (due to the earlier dopamine-induced synaptic plasticity in
the matrix cells), but little or no attendant pleasure. This proposed mechanism is thus
in accordance with the spiritual advice that lasting happiness cannot be obtained
through the acquisition of worldly goods.
Habitual thoughts may also be a form of rewarded (compulsive) behavior orchestrated
by the nucleus accumbens and causing a reduction in ongoing dopamine levels
Humans tend to spend a great deal of time engaged in discursive, ‘‘offline’’ thought, and
this mind-wandering may be associated with negative affect
Recent data suggest that we humans spend a great deal of time engaged in what is
known as ‘‘stimulus-independent thought’’ or ‘‘mind-wandering’’ (Killingsworth &
Gilbert, 2010; Klinger, 2009). This type of mental activity includes phenomena such
as daydreaming, fantasizing, and obsessing. A recent study by Killingsworth and
Gilbert (2010) used a technique in which subjects received automated phone calls
randomly interspersed throughout their waking hours. Results from a sample of
2,250 adults (58.8% male, 73.9% residing in the USA, mean age of 34) reported that
individuals were engaged in mind-wandering during 46.9% of the samples. This
corresponds well with Klinger’s (2009) estimate that approximately 50% of all human
thought can be classified as daydreaming.
Cortical cells
Accumbens cells
      (matrix)
Dopamine cells
   
Accumbens cells
      (patch)
Learned inhibition
    of dopamine
Figure 6. Schematic depiction of the accumbens circuitry involved in reward learning, as in
Figure 4.
Note: Also included here are patch-like neurons that send an inhibitory projection down to the
midbrain dopamine cells. These neurons are postulated to develop a conditioned response to
rewarded stimuli (just as do the matrix neurons). However, rather than helping orchestrate
conditioned behavioral responses, these neurons provide conditioned down-regulation of
dopamine release (see text).
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This type of mental activity often involves self-referential thoughts, perhaps
related to possible future plans or future successes. It may also involve rumination or
reliving past events. It may consist of rather mundane thoughts, such as rehearsing
our to-do list, or planning our next project. Alternatively, it may involve dreams of
victory or glory.
Interestingly, the Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010) study also reported that our
affective state is negatively impacted by mind-wandering activity. During each of the
calls mentioned above, subjects were not only asked to report their mental activity,
but also to state what physical activity they were engaged in (e.g., working, reading,
listening to music) and their current affective state (scaled from 0 to 100). As might
be predicted, these authors found that our momentary physical context influences
our mood: our hedonic tone is relatively low when we are at work, but relatively high
when we are engaged in conversation. However, the biggest single influence on
hedonic tone was the occurrence of daydreaming. There was a prominent reduction
in happiness scores during mind-wandering, and this variable accounted for more of
the between-subject variance in happiness scores (17.7%) than the actual activity in
which subjects were engaged (which accounted for only 3.2% of the between-subject
variance).
The Buddhist tradition also notes our tendency toward mind-wandering. For
example, the well-known Buddhist teacher Pema Chodron (2010) refers to our
‘‘substitute life,’’ which we live just in our own head. The Buddhist tradition has also
observed that these thoughts, regardless of whether they seem to be pleasant (e.g.,
dreams of glory) or unpleasant (e.g., fears of defeat) lead only to unhappiness.
It is very difficult to calm these discursive thought patterns
Beginning meditators often report that it is extremely difficult to clear the mind of
these discursive thoughts, even briefly. The fact that it is so difficult to halt the
ongoing stream of discursive thoughts suggests that they may be a form of addictive
behavior, not unlike the externally observable addictions involved with compulsive
hand-washing, gambling, sexual activity, eating, drug use, and so forth. Indeed,
Bigelsen and Schupak (2011) have identified a set of individuals who suffer from
compulsive fantasizing, which interferes with other productive life activities.
This analysis fits well with the Buddhist tradition, which tends to regard all
repetitive tendencies as addictions, regardless of whether they are outwardly
observable or involve commonly described substances of abuse.
Indeed, if this mind-wandering activity is a form of addictive behavior, it may be
shaped by the reward mechanisms that are dependent on the nucleus accumbens
and related structures. In fact, this mechanism has been suggested as a possible
explanation for the repetitive thought patterns involved in obsessivecompulsive
disorder (Lambert & Kinsley, 2011).
Obsessive daydreaming can be incorporated into learning models as a form of addictive,
rewarded behavior
This idea is outlined in Figure 7. Here, elements of possible fantasies are depicted as
being represented by cortical activity in the prefrontal and hippocampal regions that
project to the accumbens. As mentioned above, both regions are part of the default
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network and have been implicated as critical for the types of mental activity that
constitute mind-wandering.
These cortical activity patterns may, at least in many cases, be prompted by
external stimuli. For example, an office worker may glance at a recently purchased
lottery ticket while thumbing through his wallet; or a high-school student might be
reminded of track practice taking place later in the day. Also depicted in the cortical
layer (see Figure 7) is the stimulus representation provided by an overload of
expectations at work.
Such external cues can be expected to perhaps initiate ongoing prefrontal
(i.e., working memory) and hippocampal representations related to the stimuli and
associated events. As is well known, the hippocampus is thought to be responsible for
episodic/declarative memory. Thus, an input of lottery-related cues could be expected
to result in hippocampally driven representations of facts and episodes related to
the lottery. Presumably, these would consist of stored representations within the
hippocampal circuitry itself. As a result, this would engage the broad range of
associative, language, and sensory cortical regions with which the hippocampal
formation is interconnected (McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995). So, the
individual may be prompted to recall stories about others who have won the lottery,
and related facts about the life-changing results of such winnings.
In addition, the hippocampus is also thought to be involved in the construction
and elaboration of possible future scenarios. In the circumstance depicted here, it is
suggested that the sight of the lottery ticket may induce a hippocampal-based
daydream about the possibility of winning the lottery. As this daydream or fantasy
unfolds it will: (1) be projected onto the nucleus accumbens via projections from the
hippocampal and prefrontal regions; and (2) induce periodic activity in the
dopamine cells, as when the daydreamer imagines receiving the lottery check,
quitting work, buying a yacht, and so on.
Lottery
ticket  Trackpractice
   So much
      work
  Rehearse
to-do list
Imagine
winning
   gold
Cortical cells
(prefrontal and
hippocampal)
Accumbens cells
Dopamine cells
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Day dreams
 
 
 
 
 
 (prefrontal cortex
 and hippocampal region)
Rewarded behaviors
are strengthened
Imagine
winning
 lottery
Reward
Fantasy-based
reward learning
Figure 7. Here the reward-learning model developed in Figure 4 is applied to the learning of
habitual thought patterns such as fantasies, daydreams and obsessions.
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Thus, the cortico-accumbens loops will be engaged in a series of lottery-related
neural representations, which will periodically be punctuated by dopamine release
onto the accumbens cells. Presumably, the periodic dopamine release initiates
subjective experiences of pleasure and joy. Also, in accordance with the learning
mechanisms depicted in Figure 7, this lottery-related activity, along with the
accompanying dopamine release, can be expected to increase the strength of the
involved cortico-accumbens synapses. This means that these particular neural
activity loops are increased in their frequency of occurrence *that is, they come
to be mental compulsions.
These conditioned discursive thoughts (daydreams) would also be expected to lose their
initially pleasant aspects
Just as the dopamine release in response to external rewards is gradually down-
regulated over the course of conditioning (Figures 5 and 6), it is expected that
conditioned daydreams would also induce dopamine suppression (Figure 8). In fact,
the central claim of this paper is that our constant engagement in compulsive, repetitive
thought patterns tends to cause an ongoing, powerfully conditioned decrease in
dopamine release, so that dopamine is chronically below what would be expected in
the absence of these ongoing mental patterns. Thus, we are left with obsessive
tendencies to daydream about winning the lottery or getting through our workload,
but the sense of relaxation or happiness to all aspects of these daydreams erodes:
these thoughts become empty obsessions.
Buddhist meditation practice as a release from chronic down-regulation of dopamine
activity
Our ongoing stream of behavior and consciousness is controlled by constantly shifting
and competing activity patterns in large sets of strongly interconnected neurons known
as attractor networks
Throughout this paper I have made reference to the idea that various sets of strongly
interconnected cells located within the cortico-accumbens neural loops sometimes
Lottery
ticket
 Thought
of winning
Dopamine
Early trials Later trials Overlearning
Figure 8. Here the theoretical time course of dopamine release as a particular fantasy (about
winning the lottery) is repeatedly rehearsed.
Note: Initially, the fantasy evokes periodic dopamine bursts at points in the narrative of the
fantasy involving desirable events, such as early retirement, or the ability to purchase expensive
luxuries. As these ‘‘high points’’ become predictable due to repetition of the fantasy, the
dopamine activity decreases, just as was the case for the repeated conditioning trials conducted
by Schultz et al. (1997, 1998).
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fire together, and when they do so, they orchestrate the mental and behavioral
events that they ‘‘represent.’’ However, this idea is just one aspect of the global
understanding of attractor networks or the role of Hebbian cell assemblies (i.e.,
connected sets of neurons) in brain circuitry. Indeed, neural plasticity (usually not
dependent on dopamine) is observed throughout the nervous system.
Activity in these sets of conditioned cell assemblies is thought to arise, fall, and
hand off to other cell assemblies throughout our conscious life. In so doing, they not
only orchestrate our ongoing and shifting thought patterns, but also our behaviors
(Spivey & Dale, 2004).
Meditative concentration apparently breaks up the attractor-based ‘‘ruts’’ in neural
activity patterns
Elsewhere, I have argued that Buddhist meditation practices serve to break up the
ongoing activity in these cortical attractor networks (Sharp, 2011). I have suggested
that the brain in fact enters a state in which nearly all attractor-based activity is
stilled, from which there is unstructured and random activity throughout most, if not
all, of the cortex (Figure 9B). Since these random patterns would be entirely novel,
they would be nameless (i.e., not attached to any conditioned assemblies in language-
coding networks) and imageless (i.e., not corresponding to any worn-in visual system
assemblies).
The argument (presented in Sharp, 2011) that meditative absorption (viz.,
Samadhi) involves novel (i.e., non-attractor-based) cortical activity patterns is
complex, and involves a number of interlocking observations.
First, an essential background assumption is provided by the work of Singer and
Gray (1995; Singer, 1998). Work from Singer’s laboratory has suggested that any one
element (e.g., a percept) within conscious experience somehow emerges (or is
correlated with) activity in a closely synchronized set of concurrently active neurons.
The exact nature of any conscious event is, presumably, determined by the
neurons involved (viz., olfactory neurons cause olfactory aspects of an experience,
auditory system neurons cause auditory components, etc.). Thus, it is postulated that
stimulus processing and other cognitive and emotive processes result from the
momentary arising of synchronous activity, which involves the neural members of
previously established attractor networks (Crick & Koch, 1990; Engel, Fries, Ko¨nig,
Brecht, & Singer, 1999; Singer, 1998; Singer & Gray, 1995).
Second, electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings from adept practitioners of
Buddhist meditation reveal extreme levels of cortical synchronization during
meditative absorption (e.g., Austin, 2006; Cahn & Polich, 2006; Lutz, Greischar,
Rawlings, Ricard, & Davidson, 2004). This is so extreme that Gyorgy Buzsa´ki (2006),
a leading EEG researcher, has suggested that the EEG activity present during
meditation is strikingly similar to the activity observed during seizure activity. I have
suggested elsewhere (see Sharp, 2011) that the ability of individual attractors to
emerge under these conditions may be ‘‘swamped’’ by high levels of cholinergic
activity, which is possibly induced during these states. These high levels of
acetylcholine would be expected to reduce temporarily the strength of feedback
synapses that are responsible for connecting neurons within local attractors
(Giocomo & Hasselmo, 2007; Hasselmo & McGaughy, 2004). At the same time,
the high acetylcholine levels would temporarily increase the strength of synapses that
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Figure 9. Sets of neurons located throughout cortical and striatal regions, which have,
through the process of repetitive, conjunctive activity, become strongly interconnected so that
they form attractor networks.
Note: Three such networks are depicted here, each using a different color. (A) In this case, the
attractor network depicted in blue is currently active. Note that this attractor activity provides
strong inputs to accumbens cells that control response selection, as well as to those that inhibit
the midbrain dopamine cells. (B) Here, attractor-based activity has been broken up, so that
even though there is still random neural activity (from randomly selected cells in all three
attractor networks), no one attractor is dominant. It is suggested that this state may be
induced through meditation, and may correspond to the meditative state in which there are no
identifiable thoughts, even though there remains the ‘‘clear light of consciousness.’’ Note that
this random activity does not provide any strong input to any particular accumbens cells,
since, under these conditions, any one such cell receives input from a random set of both
strong and relatively weak synapses.
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convey stimuli from more distant afferent brain regions (Giocomo & Hasselmo,
2007; Hasselmo & McGaughy, 2004).
Thus, I suggest that this combination of extreme levels of membrane oscillatory
synchronization, along with the postulated high levels of acetylcholine, may have
created the following conditions: those in which the usually isolated packets of
synchrony, which are necessary for the emergence of individual attractor networks,
including their corresponding conscious events (e.g., thoughts, perceptions, and
memories), have disappeared.
Indeed, perhaps the most obvious evidence for this very speculative idea comes
from introspective reports about these very practices. As described above, these
practices can achieve a state of consciousness in which the mind is calmed and
ordinary thoughts no longer occur. If ordinary thoughts are dependent on attractor
network activity in highly synchronous cells, then disruption of these networks would
be expected to lead to ‘‘contentless’’ awareness. The following quote describes this
state, which arises during deep meditation:
The ordinary mind of an ordinary sentient being, as it were, disappears. Consequently,
discursive thoughts become dormant, and roving thoughts vanish into the space of
awareness . . . Adhering to the experiences of vacuity and luminosity, while looking
inwards, the appearance of oneself, others, and objects vanish. This is the substrate
consciousness . . . one has come to the essential nature of the mind. (Dudjom Lingpa, as
quoted in Wallace, 2007, p. 18)
It can be noted that these attractor-free activity states might be expected to have
some lasting effects*that is, beyond the individual meditation session (Sharp, 2011).
Specifically, they might be expected to provide an opportunity for counter-
conditioning the synaptic patterns that are in fact responsible for the continued
existence of the attractors themselves. Thus, following a deep absorptive state, one
might be left with a general loosening of the existent attractor networks. According
to the hypothesis presented here, this might be expected to leave the practitioner with
an ongoing sense of relative positive affect and freedom of thought, even after having
returned to everyday conceptual capabilities.
The absence of habitual attractor activity would release dopamine cells from the
suppression normally caused by our addictive thought patterns
The representations of reward conditioning shown in Figures 4 and 7 are extremely
simplified neural circuits in which each neural conditioning stimulus was represented
by activity in just one cortical neuron. Of course, any reward context will involve
activity in attractor networks consisting of many thousands or millions of con-
currently active cells. Presumably it is activity in large subsets of these attractor cells
that serves as the neural conditioning stimuli for the accumbens cells shown in these
figures. Thus, following conditioning, the patch-like cells responsible for conditioned
dopamine cell inhibition would be dependent*for their activation*on concurrent
activity in large subsets of attractor network cells, with which they have formed
strong connections.
Thus, when the attractor networks are broken up such that cells within any one
network no longer fire synchronously, there would no longer be any strong activation
of any particular accumbens cells. This random cortical activity might thus serve to
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disinhibit the dopamine cells and, according to evidence reviewed above, give rise to
a state of positive affect.
Evidence that is compatible with this general account comes from a recent
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) investigation of brain activity
in long-time meditation practitioners (Brewer et al., 2011). These accomplished
meditators showed lower activity levels in two critical DMN components (viz.,
medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices) during three different types of
traditional meditation, as compared to matched controls. These findings suggest that
there was reduced attractor network activity in DMN regions, which is critical for
the model being presented here.
The hypothesis presented here is compatible with the fact that accumbens cells also
respond to novelty
In general, this theoretical suggestion is highly compatible with the finding that novelty
is a strong activator of dopamine cell activity (see Schultz, 1998) and accumbens
dopamine levels (LeGault & Wise, 2001; Rebec, Christensen, Guerra, & Bardo, 1997;
Saigusa, Tuinstra, Koshikawa, & Cools, 1999). In other words, presentation of any
salient novel stimulus will induce dopamine release into the accumbens during initial
presentations. This dopamine activity diminishes over repeated presentations unless
the stimulus is an unpredicted reward (e.g., food, water, sex) or paired with reward
stimuli, as evidenced in the conditioning paradigm (see Figure 5).
Thus, meditative states, such as Samadhi or Shamatha, can be regarded as states
involving extreme levels of novelty in the cortical firing patterns, since, apparently,
none of the familiar attractor patterns are activated. According to the reward
prediction error hypothesis, these novel activity states could not provide any
conditioned input patterns to suppress dopamine release.
Why do the objects of meditation themselves not become conditioned stimuli for the
cortico-accumbens circuits?
One question raised by this analysis has to do with the fact that the meditative
practices discussed herein often employ concentration on an object of meditation, such
as the breath or a mantra, as a means to achieve the gradual disruption of discursive
thought patterns. Yet, this raises the question: why do the neural representations of
these objects not become a part of the cortico-accumbens loops that drive compulsive
thoughts and behaviors? That is, one could theorize that the meditator might become
compulsively attached to repeating the mantra or obsessing on the breath.
I propose two reasons for why this does not happen. First, in many cases, the
meditation objects are chosen to be fairly neutral (as is one’s own breathing), such that
they may not cause dopamine release (as opposed to thoughts of winning the lottery).
Thus, any breath-related neural activity that reaches the accumbens would not directly
coincide with dopamine release, since such release would not happen until the
meditative objects begin to give way to the absence of thought. In other words, the
conscious representation of the meditative object itself must be broken up at least
somewhat in order for the random activity (i.e., the attractor-less state) to be generated.
Second, it is possible that the attractor states that represent these neutral objects
of meditation (e.g., breath, mantra, etc.) do not include activity in the regions
projecting to the accumbens (see Figure 2). For example, both the medial prefrontal
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cortex and the hippocampal regions are thought to be involved in self-referential,
autobiographical information processing, and thus may not be strongly involved in
representations of the objects of meditative concentration.
Neural network analysis and the risk of materialistic reductionism
This paper has defended the idea that enduring bliss may be attained through
meditative processes that break up habitual cortical firing patterns, and thereby
disinhibit neurochemical processes in brain reward structures.
These theoretical suggestions about brain mechanisms are meant to parallel
Buddhist teachings, which claim that the potential for lasting happiness exists
abundantly within each of us*and is always available*once we become fully open
to the present and give up our grasping for external attainments.
However, the neural network analysis provided here runs the risk of seeming to
constitute a rather crude materialistic reductionism in relation to the states of conscious-
ness and spiritual insights offered by Buddhism and other meditative traditions.
One sense in which the idea of reductionism might apply here would be that the
analysis of meditative positive affect in terms of activity in brain pleasure centers
could suggest that the goal of Buddhist practice is simply to attain the ‘‘natural
high’’offered by some meditative states. On the contrary, Buddhist teachers of course
warn against such an attitude. Instead, they emphasize that a truly useful, personal
transformation must involve the disruption of ego and grasping at momentary
gratification, even if that gratification comes from simple emotional states induced
through meditation (Trungpa, 1973). Thus, although traditional Buddhist teachings
acknowledge the potential for blissful states during meditation, they also emphasize
that bliss should not be viewed as the central goal.
A second sense in which materialistic reductionism could be mistakenly inferred
here is the metaphysical suggestion that phenomenal states (i.e., conscious experience)
do not in fact exist as genuine entities (for descriptions of this position, see Chalmers
1995, 1996). According to this materialist view, only physical elements truly exist. It is
assumed that once we have described neural mechanisms which, in some sense, could
be said to provide an explanation for vicissitudes in consciousness, then we will no
longer need (or want) to acknowledge the existence of any experiential plane.
This form of materialistic reductionism is not intended here. Rather, the
philosophical underpinning for this work is provided by the naturalistic dualism
proposed by several contemporary philosophers (e.g., Chalmers 1995, 1996; Nagel,
1974). According to naturalistic dualism, conscious events (i.e., phenomenal states)
are ‘‘what it is like to be’’ the particular brain state of the experiencer.
The scientific rationale for developing the current network model is the immense
body of neuro-scientific evidence that shows that neural activity and conscious
experience are subtly and intractably entangled throughout the course of an
individual’s life. Accordingly, the introspective changes observed over the course of
a practitioner’s meditative Buddhist practice must be accompanied by corresponding
(arguably explanatory) changes in brain function.
This entanglement of mind and body is also emphasized within the ancient Vedic
and Buddhist traditions, where both the body and the mind are considered sacred.
For example, the ‘‘kundalini’’ that arises during Tummo and other Yogic practices is
viewed as involving both body and mind. These ancient traditions teach us that it is
our sacred commitment to investigate, explore, and develop these positive energies
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within others and ourselves. Perhaps the current efforts of many laboratories to
investigate the neural aspects of these energies can be viewed as a modest extension
of this ancient tradition.
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COMMENTARIES
Meditation and the DMN: an intentional approach to attention
Candace Alcorta*
Department of Anthropology, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
Sharp’s model posits an important relationship between the brain’s ‘‘default mode
network’’ (DMN) and meditation. However, three central tenets of this model are
problematic from both evolutionary and neurophysiological perspectives: (1) DMN
dysfunction; (2) unstructured and random meditative brain activity; and (3) a
dopaminergic default state of subjective happiness and bliss. Recent neuroimaging
research allows assessment of each of these assumptions and suggests an alternative
DMN/meditation model.
DMN dysfunction
The conscious resting state of the human brain is characterized by activity in a DMN
associated with daydreaming, and other discursive thought. Midline cortical and lateral
structures are linked in a ‘‘set of interacting hubs and subsystems . . . [that] . . .play an
important role in ‘internal mentation’’’ (Andrews-Hanna, 2012, p. 251). Stimuli related
to emotional attention, self-referential processing, and decision-making differentially
engage various subsystems of the DMN, while stimuli related to self-awareness and
introspective attention engage others (Eldaief, Deckersbach, Carlson, Beucke, &
Dougherty, 2012). Although several mental disorders, including perseveration,
obsessive-compulsive disorder, and depression, have been linked to abnormal DMN
function, normal functioning of this network is generally viewed as an evolutionarily
adaptive state ‘‘in which the environment is continually being surveyed and events are
assessed in relation to their impact on self to maximize the potential for survival’’ (Ives-
Deliperi, Solms, & Meintjes, 2011, pp. 239240). Rather than ‘‘a form of addiction’’
(Sharp) resulting in habituation and dopamine down-regulation, as posited by Sharp,
DMN-generated discursive thought is more likely to represent an evolved adaptation
for reflective evaluation and planning that benefits future behaviors, thereby enhancing
fitness.
Meditative brain function
According to Sharp’s model, novel cortical activity induced by meditation alleviates
DMN dopaminergic down-regulation by ‘‘breaking-up the DMN attractor-based
‘ruts’ in neural activity patterns’’. This results in ‘‘a state in which nearly all
attractor-based activity is stilled, from which there is unstructured and random
activity throughout most, if not all, of the cortex’’. Although neuroimaging research
supports Sharp’s contention that meditation alters DMN function, it does not
provide evidence of random, unstructured cortical activity.
*Email: candace.alcorta@uconn.edu
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Meditation and mindfulness training down-regulate dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex (DMPFC) and various associated networks related to ‘‘self-referential
thought and attribution of subjective significance to emotions . . . [resulting in] . . .
an overall ‘quietening’ effect on brain regions associated with subjective and
cognitive appraisal of emotions’’ (Ives-Deliperi et al., 2011, p. 239). Concomitant
with this down-regulation, up-regulation of other circuits occurs. This includes
greater connectivity between the dorsal posterior cingulate cortex (DPCC) and the
precuneus (Prakash, De Leon, Klatt, Malarkey, & Patterson, 2013), as well as
changes in insular signal amplitude and connectivity (Farb, Segal, & Anderson,
2013). While the precuneus has been implicated in self-awareness (Kjaer, Nowak, &
Lou, 2002), the bilateral insular cortex comprises the neural locus for interoceptive
attention to visceral body sensations and is a critical component of the corticostriatal
network that underlies ‘‘the ability to learn stimuli-rewards and stimuli-punishment
contingencies’’ (Metereau & Dreher, 2013, p. 477).
Specifically, the insular cortex receives homeostatic sensory input via the
thalamus and sends output to brain regions associated with emotions and reward
processing. The anterior insula functions in error awareness (Klein, Ullsperger, &
Danielmeier, 2013). ‘‘Increased cortical dopamine levels increases BOLD activity in
anterior insula and attenuates impulsive choice’’ (Kayser, Allen, Navarro-Cebrian,
Mitchell, & Fields, 2012). The insular cortex is well positioned to initiate alterations
in emotional and self-referential processing, decrease error prediction (thereby
increasing certainty), and up-regulate impulse control.
Neuroimaging studies identify the insula as a ‘‘key structure involved in aspects
of meditation’’ (Luders et al., 2012). Experienced meditators not only show increased
right anterior insula gray matter (Lazar et al., 2005), but also greater gyrification of
right anterior dorsal insula correspondent with increased meditative experience
(Luders et al., 2012). While early studies reported signal decreases in insula during
meditation (Ives-Deliperi et al., 2011), more recent research shows increased activity in
the insular cortex (Farb et al., 2013) and the inferior parietal lobe (Taylor et al., 2013)
in experienced meditators. Ongoing mindfulness training alters insular functional
connectivity, as well, with increased negative connectivity to the DMPFC and
increased positive connectivity ‘‘between primary interoceptive cortex in the posterior
insula and adjacent short gyri of the middle insula’’ (Farb et al., 2013, p. 23).
Meditation (Ives-Deliperi et al., 2011), mindfulness training (Farb et al., 2013;
Taylor et al., 2013), and dispositional mindfulness (Brown, Goodman, & Inzlicht,
2013; Paul, Stanton, Greeson, Smoski, & Wang, 2013; Prakash et al., 2013) all alter
DMN function; long-term meditative practice results in DMN network connectivity
alterations, as well. The cortical activity associated with these changes is neither
unstructured nor random, but instead reflects intentional engagement of inter-
oceptive attentional networks, with concomitant disengagement of networks related
to emotional, self-referential processing.
DMN, meditation, and dopamine
The positive affect and bliss reported by meditators are considered by Sharp to result
from ‘‘release’’ of dopamine braking that occurs when the ‘‘addictive’’ discursive
thought patterns of the DMN are disrupted and dopamine levels return to a higher
baseline ‘‘default’’ state. Yet, no evidence of either addiction or higher dopamine
baselines is presented. Moreover, such a default state is unlikely to be the case from
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evolutionary and reinforcement-learning perspectives. Since dopamine functions to
motivate approach behaviors and reinforce associational learning, high levels of
dopamine could be expected to increase risky behaviors and decrease the incentive
salience of stimuli. The developmental plasticity of dopamine also argues against a
uniformly high default state.
A more parsimonious explanation for meditatively induced feelings of peace,
certainty, and bliss is right anterior insula activation with concomitant down-
regulation of emotional and self-referential networks. In the absence of negative
emotional input, insular responses and error monitoring would produce positive
feedback, resulting in both ‘‘raised hemodynamic activity in the ventral striatum
[nucleus accumbens]’’ (Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2003, p. 4308) and a subjective
sense of pleasure and certainty (Picard, in press). Neuroimaging research on ecstatic
epileptic seizures provides strong support for this hypothesis. These studies show
hyperactivity of the right anterior insula during feelings of a ‘‘sensed presence,’’
certainty, heightened self-awareness, and ecstatic bliss (Landtblom, Lindehammar,
Karlsson, & Craig, 2011; Picard, in press; Picard and Craig, 2009), all of which have
been reported by experienced meditators, as well.
Conclusion
Sharp’s model correctly posits impacts of meditation on the DMN, with deactivation
of various components. There is no evidence, however, of obliteration of existing
DMN ‘‘attractor-based’’ networks, random cortical firing patterns during medita-
tion, or a general high dopaminergic default state. Rather, mindfulness traits,
meditation, and mindfulness training all appear to involve an attentional shift in
neural networks that preference interoceptive over exteroceptive processing (Farb
et al., 2013; Paul et al., 2013). This shift activates neural structures and pathways
in a decidedly structured and non-random pattern that is specifically focused on
insular networks, particularly the right anterior insula. Activation of these networks
down-regulates emotional, self-referential processing with a concomitant up-
regulation of dopamine in insular and striatal regions. The outcome is greater
impulse control, decreased error prediction, and subjective feelings of meditative
clarity, self-awareness, certainty, and bliss.
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Bliss and authenticity: a commentary on target article by Pat Sharp
Zoran Josipovic*
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, USA
Sharp proposes an innovative, albeit speculative, theory that accounts for an often-
reported experience of bliss or ecstatic pleasure that accompanies practices of
meditation. She proposes that meditative practices disrupt the learning-dependent,
down-regulation of dopaminergic neurons in the nucleus accumbens, which are
associated with various addictions and repetitive mental states such as certain types
of mind-wandering or ruminating. The result of such dis-inhibition is an increased
level of pleasure and bliss that are experienced as one’s ongoing baseline state.
Sharp primarily references the Buddhist teachings found in the Tibetan Tantric
Vajrayana tradition that use the generation of bliss as a method for enhancing
realization of emptiness (see Lama, 1985). Her starting claim is that the nucleus
accumbens (NAcc) might be the site primarily affected by these meditation practices,
since they specifically simulate stages of sexual arousal, known to involve NAcc. Her
*Email: zoran@nyu.edu
32 Z. Josipovic
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ow
lin
g G
ree
n S
U]
 at
 06
:41
 30
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
14
 
less obvious and more intriguing idea is that, unlike behaviors and substances usually
associated with pursuing pleasure, these meditation practices do not lead to
habituation and down-regulation of dopaminergic neurons in NAcc, despite the
constant repetition of meditation practice. Sharp draws this conclusion, in part, from
a study by Kjaer et al. (2002) that found high dopamine levels in long-time
meditation practitioners. Furthermore, Sharp hypothesizes, in line with the teachings
of these traditions, that our ordinary state of mind is engaged in repetitive com-
pulsive thought patterns that constitute mind-wandering, and that such repetitive
patterns decrease levels of dopamine, and are meditated by various neuronal
attractor network states. On this theory, the mechanism responsible for the
relaxation or even abolishment of such attractor networks and the dis-inhibition
of dopaminergic cells in the NAcc during deep meditation (when consciousness is
isolated from phenomenal content and reduced to a basic non-conceptual awareness)
is an increase in acetylcholine. This neurotransmitter causes de-synchronizations in
local neuronal populations and increases in long-range gamma synchrony.
This view tallies well with the behaviorist notion that human psychology is
primarily driven by conditioning. It also tallies well with a view of enlightenment
found in certain schools of Buddhism. This view sees enlightenment as a gradual
purification or removal of unwanted conditioning from the ‘‘substrate’’ (Sansk.
Alaya vijnana). that is, a level of consciousness that some Buddhists believe is
responsible for storing memories (e.g., Thrangu, 2002).
However, these contemplative traditions also contain a different, perhaps more
refined view, according to which enlightenment is not a matter of purifying the
conditioned patterns of thought, endless as they are. Rather, spiritual maturation is a
matter of realizing a deeper, more fundamental level of our consciousness*namely,
the nature of mind itself, which is present, although usually unrecognized, as basic
background awareness in all conscious experiences (Rabjam, 2007). According to
these philosophies, the goal of the meditation is to bring such awareness into ‘full
view’, allowing it to encounter and realize itself. This can be done by either reducing
the phenomenal content, as in the example of Tantric meditation, or by identifying
this very subtle awareness within the stream of one’s usual daily experiencing (Lama
xiv, 2004). The result of such nondual realization is not only a relaxation of some of
the habitually conditioned states of mind and body, but also a re-contextualization in
which conscious experiences ‘self-liberate’ because they are recognized to be
phenomenally non-different from nondual awareness (Norbu & Lipman, 1987).
This view may be significant for contemporary research on consciousness in several
ways. For one thing, not all mind-wandering is constituted by repetitive neurosis-
driven thought patterns. Mind-wandering can also be a form of creative thinking
that in itself can be highly pleasurable, and is directly related to one’s creative
capacity, as recent studies show (e.g., Baird et al., 2012; Takeuchi et al., 2011). Thus,
an overgeneralization of all mind-wandering and its underlying default-mode
network activity as being undesirable could result in dissociating ourselves from
important aspects of our experience that make us fully human. The key here is to
acknowledge the broad aims of meditation. The purpose of meditative practices is
not only to construct a post-meditation state of quiescence (one in which attractor
networks are abolished), but also to realize the ‘‘all-pervading’’ space of basic nondual
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awareness that contextualizes both self-related and other-related, as well as intrinsic
and extrinsic experiences.
In terms of the possible neural mechanisms of such large-scale integration, recent
research (Josipovic et al., 2012) shows that nondual awareness meditation results in
an increase of functional connectivity, and by inference in the underlying
synchronization, between large-scale globally distributed neural networks  the
intrinsic default mode network and the extrinsic task-positive network. As
hypothesized elsewhere (Josipovic, in press), a network for nondual awareness may
provide an organizing center, re-contextualizing the activity of other networks and
attractors involved in representing experience during a ‘‘nondual state.’’ A somewhat
similar contextualizing and organizing function has been proposed for the
paralimbic areas that overlap with the intrinsic default mode network and mediate
the sense of self (Baars, Franklin, & Ramsoy, 2013; Lou et al., 2011). However, this
awareness network is different in that it involves the central precuneus, and also its
projections to the lateral prefrontal and inferior parietal areas (Margulies et al.,
2009). It is possible that during nondual states, this network contributes to binding
other networks into an enlarged global workspace. A key feature of such a network
would be that it could represent its own state, in addition to integrating
informational content. This would enable the network to mediate awareness
independently of phenomenal content.
Thus, from a nondual point of view, the purpose of meditation practice is not a
state of perfection in which all bothersome experiences and their corresponding
attractor networks have ceased, but rather a freedom of being in which we can allow
all of our experiences to be authentic (‘‘as they are’’). This would result from our
experiences being recontextualized and integrated within the larger ‘‘all-encompassing’’
space of nondual awareness, such that they would ‘‘reflect,’’ in addition to their specific
phenomenal properties, the more or less invariant*some would say innate*properties
of the nature of mind: spacious openness, luminous clarity, and compassionate bliss.
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Adaptive functions and default nature of undirected thought, bliss or not:
correcting some misconceptions
Eric Klinger*
Division of Social Sciences, Psychology Discipline, University of Minnesota, Morris, USA
With great thanks to Patricia Sharp for her excellent synthesis of a wide-ranging
field, I nevertheless seek here to correct depictions of ‘‘daydreams, fantasies’’ and
‘‘discursive thoughts,’’ presumably subsuming mind-wandering*that is, undirected
thinking, consciously unintentional*as wasted mental activity that lowers mood.
First, there are observational reasons to suppose that undirected thinking
constitutes a natural baseline for mental activity (Klinger, 1971). For instance, brain-
imaging results reported by Mason et al. (2007) demonstrate a close association between
mind-wandering states and the brain’s ‘‘default network.’’ This network is typically
active when participants are unengaged in goal-directed mental activity (Gusnard,
Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001). Behavioral studies also suggest that undirected
mental activity, such as mind-wandering, occurs during a third or even up to a half of all
waking states on average (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Klinger & Cox, 198788). It is
highly unlikely that such a large portion of brain activity would have survived in the
course of evolution without some kind of adaptive function (e.g., Baars, 2010).
It is now reasonably well established that the content of undirected thinking and
dreams is predominantly associated, directly or indirectly, with the particular
individual’s pursuit of goals (Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011; Hoelscher,
Klinger, & Barta, 1981; Klinger, 1978, 1990, 2009; Klinger & Cox, 2011; Nikles,
Brecht, Klinger, & Bursell, 1998; Smallwood, Brown, Baird, & Schooler, 2012;
Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011), which is readily
activated in the presence of goal-related cues. It would be surprising if such cues filled
the mind with goal-related content that was not helpful in the individual’s pursuit of
his or her goals.
There is, in fact, ample anecdotal evidence of creative problem-solving instances,
in both the arts and the sciences, occurring during moments of undirected thought
(Klinger, 1990; Singer, 2009). Moreover, there is experience-sampling evidence of
spontaneous planning (Baird et al., 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011) and experimental
evidence that undirected thought incubates problems and increases subsequent
creative solutions (Baird et al., 2012). Such spontaneous, undirected planning, which
may involve executive brain components (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, &
Schooler, 2009), and sometimes shifts thought content into operant or directed
planning, is likely to benefit individual success in the pursuit of one’s particular goals.
Mental activity of this sort is a way of keeping individuals aware of their larger
*Email: klinger@morris.umn.edu
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agendas even while occupied with a single task. Thought-sampling evidence indicates
that the median duration of thought segments (that is, continuous focus on a single
topic) is only about five seconds, with a mean of about 14 seconds (Klinger, 1978,
1990); i.e., the undirected stream of thought typically visits a variety of the
individual’s goal domains. This continuous mental review serves as a reminder
mechanism regarding an individual’s agenda of goals, both short-term and longer-
term. Thus, undirected thinking is a way for the brain to process goal-related
material during times when ongoing tasks do not fully absorb the brain’s resources.
Indeed, meditation disciplines strive to suppress this kind of undirected thought,
and focused perception is one way of doing so. The classical forms of meditation
involve prolonged instances of continuous perception, such as focusing upon a
mandala, or repetitive focused activity, as in a mantra or dance exercise, and
instances such as these strive to maintain a thought-suppressing perceptual set, even
as the perceptual contents fade. Achieving this perceptual set may be the central
ingredient of meditative disciplines.
Sharp’s statement about Killingsworth and Gilbert’s (2010) findings, that ‘‘There
was a prominent reduction in happiness scores during mind-wandering,’’ reflects a
reasonable interpretation of what Killingsworth and Gilbert implied, but not what
their data actually revealed. Their participants rated 42.5% of their mind-wandering
episodes as about something ‘‘pleasant,’’ with their moods during such episodes
averaging only slightly above their overall mood, and thus roughly equaling their
mood when their minds were not wandering. They rated 31% of the remaining mind-
wandering episodes as being about something ‘‘neutral,’’ with their average mood
being slightly below the overall average but above the midpoint of the mood scale.
Participants rated their mood as sharply below the overall average and below the
scale midpoint during only 26.5% of mind-wandering samples, which they
characterized as being about something ‘‘unpleasant.’’ Thus, only particular thought
content, not mind-wandering as such, was associated with lowered mood (see also
Stawarczyk, Majerus, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2012). Killingsworth and
Gilbert (2010) also performed time-lag analyses, finding that mood was lower in
samples obtained after a mind-wandering episode than after a non-mind-wandering
episode, but these episodes were on average hours apart, sometimes separated by a
night, which suggests that something other than mind-wandering accounted for their
results. These results are inconsistent with another investigation that found no effect
of mind-wandering on mood 15 minutes after the mind-wandering episode (Poerio,
2012). Furthermore, Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010) found little effect of low-mood
episodes on subsequent mind-wandering, which is inconsistent with other evidence
indicating that inducing negative moods increases mind-wandering (Smallwood,
Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009) during approximately the following half hour,
measured both objectively and by subjective self-report.
Sharp suggests that undirected thinking may be ‘‘addictive,’’ but there are reasons
to doubt that this is the case in most instances. Certainly, some individuals spend
more time in imaginative daydreams than others, and a subset of these individuals
regret the time that they waste during mind-wandering episodes (e.g., Bigelsen &
Schupak, 2011); but many of these individuals are nonetheless accomplished
professionals with successful family lives (e.g., Singer, 1975, 2009; Wilson & Barber,
1983). As indicated above, undirected thinking appears to be a universal human
activity governed by the individual’s goal commitments and emotional reactions to
those goals. The tone of their thought content governs their degree of ‘‘enjoyability.’’
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However, the people who would perhaps have the greatest reason to escape into
fantasy, those who are depressed, tend to have on average rather unhappy and boring
daydreams (Giambra & Traynor, 1978) and negatively toned ruminations (e.g.,
Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). These states are unlikely to be
addictive. The literature on ‘‘fantasy proneness,’’ triggered by Wilson and Barber’s
work, for a time suggested a tie of fantasy-proneness to psychopathology. Yet,
analysis of the items in the most commonly used measure of fantasy-proneness,
namely the Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings (which is flawed for
assessing daydreaming), yields two strongest factors. Of these, one is heavily
associated with dissociative symptoms and correlated with a variety of psycho-
pathologies, and the second is associated with enjoyment of imaginative products,
including ordinary daydreaming, and is uncorrelated with nearly all psychopathol-
ogies (Klinger, Henning, & Janssen, 2009).
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A creative and insightful cognitive neuroscience approach for
understanding the effects of contemplative training on pleasure
and the ‘‘gossip of the ego’’
Katherine A. MacLeana and Gary Weberb*
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In ‘‘Meditation-induced bliss viewed as release from conditioned neural (thought)
patterns that block reward signals in the brain pleasure center,’’ Sharp provides an
innovative framework for understanding the neurochemistry of pleasure, addiction,
and sustained states of positive mood that can be realized through contemplative
training. Sharp presents a clear and comprehensive overview of how traditional sources
of pleasure, such as sex and various recreational drugs, are reinforced neurochemically
to the point of addiction, resulting in pleasure saturation and down-regulation of
dopaminergic circuits with repeated exposure. A critical focus is demonstrating how
thoughts*the ever-present, mostly self-referential background chatter of the mind*
are another dopamine-enhanced pleasure-inducing activity that turns into an
addiction. The pleasure of this ‘‘gossip of the ego’’ is down-regulated over time,
resulting in meaningless repetition of self-referential fantasizing and daydreaming in a
vain attempt to regain the initial pleasure, followed by boredom and depression.
*Email: happinessbeyondthought@gmail.com
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Sharp presents the intriguing hypothesis that contemplative training, via its effects
on reward pathways in the brain, offers a sustainable and blissful alternative to our
habitual patterns of endless thinking and pleasure seeking. This hypothesis is
informed by a large body of literature on the nature of addiction and treatment of
substance dependence, including how craving, stress, and negative psychological
states, such as anxiety and depression, fuel the cycle of suffering (see Brewer, Elwafi, &
Davis, 2012). A key point is how meditation creates pleasurable states similar to those
generated by traditional reinforcing stimuli using similar neurotransmitters and
routes. Yet the pleasures associated with meditation do not diminish with repeated
exposure. Indeed, long-term practitioners report enhanced positive experiences of
everyday stimuli, a claim that can be tested using techniques in psychophysics, visual
neuroscience, and affective neuroscience.
Sharp’s paper is an important addition to modern scholarship on Buddhism, as
few Buddhist teachers in the West mention a ‘‘thought-free’’ approach, since most
regard elimination of thought as undesirable or impossible. There are many other
meditative traditions that do focus on the elimination of the ‘‘gossip of the ego’’ to
reduce suffering. For example, the iconic Zen Buddhist teacher Dogen stated:
‘‘Be without thoughts*this is the secret of meditation’’ (Dogen Fuken Zazengi,
1227). Similar comments are made in a variety of eastern sources, such as the
following: Tao Te Ching: ‘‘Empty your mind of all thoughts. Let your heart be at
peace’’ (Mitchell, 1992, p. 101); Advaita Vedanta: ‘‘The thought-free state is one’s
primal state and full of bliss’’ (Ramana Maharshi, 2000, p. 224) and ‘‘To be free from
thoughts is itself meditation’’ (Nisargadatta Maharaj, 1973, p. 224); the Bhagavad
Gita: ‘‘With the intellect held steadfast and the mind sunk in the Self, allowing no
thought to arise’’ (Ramana Maharshi, 1995, p. 11); and, finally, Dzogchen: ‘‘All
thought activity is naturally liberated . . .’’ (Ray, 2001, p. 314).
The contemplative approaches described by Sharp are those most commonly
studied in psychological and neuroscientific research. For instance, they advocate the
use of concentration upon an object (e.g., the breath) or receptive awareness of
sensations (Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, & Davidson, 2008). The ‘‘ego deconstructive’’
approaches used in Zen and Advaita Vedanta specifically focus on deconstructing the
self through inquiry, ultimately leading to a state of effortless awareness characterized
by no (or few) self-referential thoughts. Anecdotally, practitioners report that
analytical thoughts used for planning and problem-solving are functionally enhanced.
The neurochemical framework presented by Sharp should apply to the inquiry-based
approaches, as well as concentrative and receptive meditation approaches.
However, considering the abundance of neurophysiology (electroencephalogra-
phy (EEG)) and neuroimaging (functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI))
studies of meditation (e.g., Jha, 2012; Tang & Posner, 2013), it is remarkable that
more research has not been done on the neurochemistry or neurobiology of
contemplative training. Sharp draws attention to the single published study showing
meditation-related increases in dopamine in the nucleus accumbens (Kjaer et al.,
2002). One study of a 12-week yoga intervention found increases in thalamic levels of
GABA (a major inhibitory neurotransmitter) that were correlated with decreases in
anxiety and improvements in mood (Streeter et al., 2010). Other studies have
examined meditation training-related changes in stress hormones such as cortisol
(e.g. Jacobs et al., 2013).
Controlled studies of changes in neurochemistry during meditation (acute, state
effects) and following periods of meditation training (longitudinal, trait effects)
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would be important, and are now possible. For example, neuroimaging techniques,
such as positron emission tomography (PET), can be used to study changes in
dopamine, endogenous opioids, and serotonin. Additionally, advances in high-field-
strength magnetic resonance spectroscopy (7T MRS) offer new opportunities to
study in vivo changes in glutamate and GABA. It will also be important to examine
concomitant changes in neuro-hormones such as oxytocin.
A potentially fruitful approach would be to combine meditation with pharma-
cologic manipulations to test the role of specific neurotransmitter systems in
contemplative training. Cross-study findings suggest some overlap in brain regions
that are deactivated (and functionally uncoupled) during meditation (e.g., Brewer
et al., 2012) and after administration of the selective serotonin agonist psilocybin
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2012). These regions in medial prefrontal and posterior
cingulate cortex are key nodes in the default mode network, and are alleged to
maintain a representation of self versus other, and self in time (Andrews-Hanna,
Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010). Psilocybin has been shown to occasion
experiences of selflessness and unity associated with acute and long-term increases in
positive mood, well-being, and openness (Griffiths et al., 2011; Griffiths, Richards,
Johnson, McCann, & Jesse, 2008; Griffiths, R.R., Richards, W.A., McCann, U.D., &
Jesse, 2006; MacLean, Johnson, & Griffiths, 2011). Administering psilocybin to
meditators is one way to investigate the role of serotonin in contemplative training,
and experiences of selflessness and bliss.
A developmental perspective is also useful when investigating the human mind,
whether through neuroscience or contemplative training. Most research studies of
meditation have focused on adults, but it may be possible to use findings from
neuroscientific studies of reward, learning and motivation (see Ernst, Daniele, &
Frantz, 2011) to pinpoint critical stages in development when meditation may be
most effective.
Prominent Buddhist scholars have proposed that the purpose or goal of
contemplative practice is to cultivate enduring happiness through selflessness and
compassion (Dambrun & Ricard, 2011; Ricard, 2011). Sharp’s paper is likely to draw
criticism from some Buddhist teachers out of concern that naı¨ve practitioners may
incorrectly assume that bliss is the primary goal of meditation, and thus become
attached to the meditative object. Future research can clarify how phenomenological
states such as bliss contribute to the practical and ethical issues of alleviating one’s
own suffering and the suffering of others.
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Seizure-induced bliss: a commentary on ‘‘meditation-induced bliss viewed
as release from conditioned neural (thought) patterns that block reward
signals in the brain pleasure center’’
Steven C. Schachter*
Departments of Neurology, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Massachusetts General
Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA
In her thought-provoking paper, Sharp argues that blissful joy is suppressed by
discursive thoughts and, conversely, enabled by states of absent thought that she
characterizes as openness, formlessness, and clarity, such as that produced during
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meditation when ‘‘content-laden thought (e.g., fantasies, daydreams, plans) ceases.’’
The proposed neuroanatomical basis for this phenomenon is the nucleus accumbens,
identified as one of the brain’s centers for producing bliss, which is hypothesized to
be inhibited by everyday thoughts. Neurochemically, dopamine and opiates,
neurotransmitters that activate the nucleus accumbens and which in turn are used
by this structure to engage a neural network to achieve a blissful state, are theorized
to become down-regulated by everyday thoughts, analogous to the consequences of
exposure to exogenous opiates or dopaminergic drugs.
This commentary focuses on so-called ecstatic and orgasmic seizures in persons
with epilepsy, and how these experiments of nature may provide empirical support
for Sharp’s central argument. Beyond the scope of these comments are the related
topics of the association of meditation with seizures or seizure-like activity (Lansky &
St. Louis, 2006), briefly mentioned by Sharp, and the religious aspects of ecstatic
seizures.
Epileptic seizures are sudden changes in behavior, which may or may not be
apparent to others, that result when interconnected neuronal networks in the brain
suddenly become hypersynchronized in their functioning. The resulting behavioral
manifestations are determined by the specific neuronal networks that are involved
during the seizure. Consciousness may or may not be altered, in which case the
patient may or may not be aware of motor, sensory, autonomic, or subjective
experiences, including affective states such as blissful joy.
According to Hughes (2005), the ecstatic seizure was made famous by the
Russian writer Fyodor Dostoevsky (182181) as described by his character Prince
Myshkin in The Idiot:
The sensation of life, the consciousness of self, were multiplied almost tenfold at these
moments, which lasted no longer than a lightning-flash. . . all his anxieties were laid at
rest at once. . . they were all resolved into a lofty calm, full of serene, harmonious joy
and hope, full of reason and ultimate comprehension. (Yarmolinsky, 1965, p. 158)
Dostoevsky himself had epilepsy, and the description of his own seizures is
similar:
I experience such happiness as is impossible under ordinary conditions, and of which
other people can have no notion. I feel complete harmony in myself and in the world and
this feeling is so strong and sweet that for several seconds of such bliss one would give
ten years of one’s life, indeed, perhaps one’s whole life. (Yarmolinsky, 1965, p. 158)
Interestingly, Dostoevsky was also a compulsive gambler (Hughes, 2005).
Published case reports further document the nature of ecstatic seizures and the
similarity to the state of bliss described by Sharp. For instance, Cirignotta, Todesco,
and Lugaresi (1980) reported a 30-year-old man with episodes of ‘‘psychomotor
arrest, slight lapse of consciousness, and above all, an ineffable sensation of ‘joy’.’’
The joy he felt was ‘‘so intense that he cannot find its match in reality. . . His mind,
his whole being is pervaded by a sense of total bliss.’’ (p. 706). Naito and Matsui also
reported a 62-year-old woman with epilepsy from a head injury who explained her
seizure as follows:
Triple haloes appeared around the sun. Suddenly the sunlight became intense.
I experienced a revelation of God and all creation glittering under the sun. The sun
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became bigger and engulfed me. My mind, my whole being was pervaded by a feeling of
delight. (Naito and Matsui 1988, p. 123)
In their series of five patients with ecstatic seizures, Picard and Craig (2009)
defined ecstasy as a ‘‘state of heightened consciousness in which an individual has a
transcendent capacity for exceptional mental clarity and an intensely positive
emotional experience,’’ (p. 539) again similar to the phenomenon described by
Sharp. They observed that during ecstatic seizures, patients had a strongly altered
subjective perception of time, space, and the self. Neurophysiological and neuror-
adiological investigations suggested that these seizures and the resulting affective
state were produced by hyper-activation of the anterior insula, which is consistent
with the putative role of the anterior insular cortex in time perception (Craig, 2009)
and the subjective feeling of states that underlie self-awareness and self-conscious-
ness (Craig, 2009; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, O¨hman, & Dolan, 2004). While the
insula has reciprocal connections with a number of brain regions, particularly
germane to Sharp’s thesis are the insular connections with the basal ganglia, which
are said to support ‘‘hedonic evaluation and motivational approach to positively
valenced stimuli’’ (Vijayaraghavan et al., 2012, p. 1). The nucleus accumbens and
insula are reciprocally interconnected; the insula influences activity of the nucleus
accumbens (Cho et al., 2012) and stimulation of the nucleus accumbens activates the
insula (Knight et al., 2013).
Orgasmic seizures were first described in 1983 by Remillard et al. (1983). Janszky
et al. (2004) reported seven patients who experienced orgasmic sensations at the start
of their seizures. The authors speculated that the seizures arose from the same brain
regions responsible for physiological orgasms during coitus or masturbation.
A candidate region for producing orgasmic seizures is the right amygdala, which
was the site of seizure onset of another patient with orgasmic seizures whose
symptoms were reproduced with electrical stimulation of the same area (Bancaud
et al., 1970), and which has been shown to be activated during non-ictal orgasm
(Heath, 1972). Of relevance to Sharp’s hypothesis, excitatory transmission from the
amygdala to the nucleus accumbens, which could occur during seizures arising from
this structure, facilitates reward-related behavior (Stuber et al., 2011).
Indeed, a fuller understanding of seizure-induced bliss would likely yield
additional insights into Sharp’s hypothesized antagonistic relationship between
everyday thoughts and ‘‘immense and abiding joy,’’ including the relevant
neuroanatomy, neurophsysiology, and neurochemistry, and advance the ongoing
efforts in neurophilosophy to elucidate the borderlands between mind and brain.
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Modeling meditation bliss: addiction and the ‘‘default mode’’ of
self-referential processing (Comment on Sharp, ‘‘Meditation Bliss. . .’’)
Michael L. Spezio
aPsychology & Neuroscience, Scripps College, Claremont, CA, USA; bDivision of Humanities
and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, USA; cInstitut fu¨r
Systematische Neurowissenschaften, Universita¨ts-Klinikum-Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany
When western cognitive science engages and tries to explain cognitive stages or states
or processes claimed by religious traditions, two critical questions must be asked.
First, is the scientific construal of the targeted stage, state, or process adequate to the
meaning of the religious claims? Second, even if the answer to the first question is
‘‘No,’’ does the proposed theory of the targeted stage, state, or process have scientific
merit? That is, does it identify a stage, state, or process that is of interest apart from
religious contexts, and does it propose an evidentially compelling theory of the said
target?
Not all scientific approaches to religiously based practices or claims have the
rigorous engagement of religious traditions, concepts, or contexts as a goal.
A significant number of scientific investigations into mindfulness, for example,
have no interest in or connection to the conceptual roots of Buddhism (Payne, 2011;
Rapgay & Bystrisky, 2009). Widely used self-report instruments of ‘‘mindfulness’’ as
a psychological construct, such as the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS),
are broadly taken to accurately measure trait mindfulness construed as attentive
awareness (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Brown, Weinstein, & Creswell, 2012; Way, Creswell,
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Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2010). However, it is known that the construal of
mindfulness as ‘‘attentive awareness’’ in the MAAS construct (Brown & Ryan, 2003)
neither captures Buddhist meanings of mindfulness (Payne, 2011), nor does it
amount to much more than a positive measurement of dispositional inattentiveness,
the reverse of which does not directly correspond to the desired measurement of
mindful attention (Van Dam, Earleywine, & Borders, 2010). So the MAAS neither
concerns itself with Buddhist mindfulness, nor does it appear to have good construct
validity as a measure or component theory of what cognitive science defines as
attentive awareness.
The target article proposes a theory that meditation results in bliss by reducing
the chronic down-regulation of dopaminergic input into the nucleus accumbens
(NAcc), and it identifies the causes of this down-regulation as compulsive, offline
thought that is discursive in nature and is equated to mind-wandering. According to
the theory, compulsive, repetitive thought is akin to addiction and the meditation-
induced bliss is akin to pleasure elicited by food, drugs, and sex. Thus, the effects of
compulsive, repetitive thought*also expressed as meta-stable attractors*can be
analyzed via mechanisms of substance addiction. Moreover, the process of
meditation-induced bliss can be analyzed via mechanisms of cocaine- and other
stimulant-induced pleasure*though it should be noted that lesions of the dopamine
system in NAcc do not interfere with addiction-related behaviors in response to
heroin (see Koob & Volkow, 2009). It is not entirely clear if the theory targets only
reward-based fantasization, or if it includes rumination that is rewarding only
according to a subjective utility theory, and thus might include negative outcomes or
memories as content. Likewise, it is unclear whether it includes all compulsive,
repetitive thought. The emphasis in the paper is on daydreaming or positive fantasy,
such as fantasies about winning the lottery. The theory has these repeated reward-
expectancy self-narratives (RESNs, ‘‘resins’’) habitually predicting rewards, and thus
driving down dopaminergic input into the NAcc.
Several elements of the theory deserve brief mention without expanded
treatment, due to space limitations. First, the identification of hedonic bliss with
concepts of bliss and rapture in Buddhism’s Pali canon is not well supported,
especially given the complex constructs of sama¯dhi and jha¯na. Second, the Pali canon
clearly has bliss co-occurring with stable mental states, such as discernment and
concentration, both of which could be expressed as stable attractor networks. The
first and second jha¯nas associate with the distinct states of pı¯ti (joy, rapture) and
sukha (happiness, pleasure, bliss), where sukha is less intense than pı¯ti (Griffiths,
1983). Both rapture and bliss co-occur with ‘‘the basic cognitive/verbal functions of
the mind’’ (i.e., the conception and discernment of vitakka and vica¯ra) in the first
jha¯na, while the second jha¯na has rapture and bliss together with concentrative mind
(eka¯grata¯), leaving classification behind (Griffiths, 1983, pp. 5960). Third, the
proposed theory does not address the cognitive processes of contemplative practice
or the cognitive processes entrained in the contemplative character, all of which
would be expressed as some form of stable or meta-stable attractor network. Indeed,
one study cited by the discussion paper shows stable functional connectivity
networks in contemplative adepts, both during and after specific meditative
practices, consistent with state- and trait-associated network stability and habitual
cognition (Brewer et al., 2011). Such transformation of habit/us is an expected
outcome of any practice that aims to affect value-based choice, especially in the
context of virtuous character (Peterson, Van Slyke, Spezio, Reimer, & Brown, 2010;
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Porter, 2005; Reimer, Spezio et al., 2011; Reimer, Young et al., 2012; Romanus
Cessario, 2009).
The proposed theory relies primarily on two lines of evidence from the scientific
literature, both of which should be examined in detail. The first uses a model of
dopaminergic-dependent learning and relates it to addiction to argue that stable,
habitual cognition depresses dopaminergic signaling to, and within, the NAcc. The
second uses neuroimaging analyses of the ‘‘default mode network’’ (DMN) in
contemplative adepts to argue that stable, habitual cognition is reduced or eliminated
in the contemplative character.
The basis for the theory’s claim that addiction leads to decreased dopaminergic
signaling is the primary value learned value (PVLV) connectionist model proposed to
explain dopamine responses in reinforcement learning (Hazy, Frank, & O’Reilly,
2010). In reinforcement learning, dopamine release associated with a primary value
(PV), or unconditioned stimulus (US), becomes associated with the learned value
(LV), or conditioned stimulus (CS) (as shown in Figure 5 of the discussion paper).
Yet the PVLV model is a theory of dopaminergic responses during learning and not a
theory of dopamine activity in addiction. Indeed, established models of addiction,
including those referenced by the discussion paper (Koob & Volkow, 2009; Volkow
et al., 2007), do not implicate reinforcement-learning mechanisms in explaining
dopamine activity differences due to addiction. Rather, prevailing models by Koob,
Volkow, and others (e.g. Koob & Le Moal, 2008; Koob & Volkow, 2009) implicate
increased dopamine activation in the NAcc during the transition to addiction,
developing into dopamine-increased signaling in the dorsal striatum (i.e., caudate,
putamen) in ‘‘habitual, compulsive’’ addiction (Koob & Volkow, 2009, p. 229).
Additionally, these models specify a key role for dysfunction in connectivity of the
prefrontal cortex, resulting in dysfunctional associations between context and reward
processing in the striatum. None of the explanatory models of addiction rely on
reinforcement-learning models to the same degree that the discussion paper does
when it links meditation-induced bliss to the elimination of habitual, compulsive,
addictive thought. The model of meditation-induced bliss presented in the discussion
paper would benefit from additional engagement of the details of these prevailing,
evidence-based addiction models.
A second area for additional consideration by the proposed theory is the use of
literature surrounding the so-called DMN. There is now clear evidence that what was
once thought to be a unitary system called the DMN is really best understood as a
heterogeneous set of functionally connected systems that are active during times
when no defined goal-oriented task is being done (Salomon, Levy, & Malach, 2013).
The discussion paper emphasizes the originally identified DMN, that connectivity
between the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the perigenual anterior cingulate
cortex (pACC). While it is true that experienced practitioners of meditation show
significant differences in this network compared to inexperienced controls, these
differences were only significant when participants followed specific instructions to
meditate (Brewer et al., 2011). It is likely that the meditation-naı¨ve controls had no
knowledge of how to follow the instructions, and so they gave up after a time, and
thus it would be expected that they reverted to ‘‘default’’ modes of ‘‘self-referential
processing.’’ Further, in many experiments investigating DMN systems, goal-related
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tasks reduce DMN-related activation (Salomon et al., 2013), with no systematic
increase of bliss.
Quite independent of the question of whether the model of meditation-induced
bliss adequately captures Buddhist phenomenology and theories of mind, the
scientific elements of the model are suboptimal. They do not adequately draw on
the best current science of either addiction or of habitual, self-referential processing,
to say nothing of the relation between them.
References
Brewer, J.A., Worhunsky, P.D., Gray, J.R., Tang, Y.-Y., Weber, J., & Kober, H. (2011). Meditation
experience is associated with differences in default mode network activity and connectivity.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, 2025420259. doi:10.1073/pnas.1112029
108/-/DCSupplemental
Brown, K.W., & Ryan, R.M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and its role in
psychological well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 822848. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.84.4.822
Brown, K.W., Weinstein, N., & Creswell, J.D. (2012). Trait mindfulness modulates neuroendocrine and
affective responses to social evaluative threat. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 37, 20372041. doi:10.1016/
j.psyneuen.2012.04.003
Griffiths, P. (1983). Buddhist jha¯na: A form-critical study. Religion, 13, 5568. doi:10.1016/0048-
721X(83)90005-2
Hazy, T.E., Frank, M.J., & O’Reilly, R.C. (2010). Neural mechanisms of acquired phasic dopamine
responses in learning. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 34, 701720. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.
2009.11.019
Koob, G.F., & Le Moal, M. (2008). Addiction and the brain antireward system. Annual Review of
Psychology, 59, 2953. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093548
Koob, G.F., & Volkow, N.D. (2009). Neurocircuitry of addiction. Neuropsychopharmacology, 35, 217238.
doi:10.1038/npp.2009.110
Payne, R.K. (2011). The cognitive sciences and classical Buddhist philosophy of mind. In J.W. Haag,
G.R. Peterson & M.L. Spezio (Eds.), The Routledge companion to religion and science (pp. 296307).
New York: Routledge.
Peterson, G.R., Van Slyke, J., Spezio, M.L., Reimer, K., & Brown, W.S. (2010). The rationality of ultimate
concern: Moral exemplars, theological ethics, and the science of moral cognition. Theology and
Science, 8, 139161.
Porter, J. (2005). Virtue. In G. Meilander & W. Werpehowski (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of theological
ethics (pp. 205219). New York: Oxford University Press.
Rapgay, L., & Bystrisky, A. (2009). Classical mindfulness. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,
1172, 148162. doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04405.x
Reimer, K.S., Spezio, M.L., Brown, W.S., Van Slyke, J., Peterson, G., & Monroe, K.R. (2011). Political
courage: New methods for the interdisciplinary study of virtue. In K.R. Monroe (Ed.), Science, ethics,
and politics: Conversations and investigations. New York: Paradigm Publishers.
Reimer, K.S., Young, C., Birath, B., Spezio, M.L., Peterson, G., Van Slyke, J., . . . & Brown, W.S. (2012).
Maturity is explicit: Self-importance of traits in humanitarian moral identity. The Journal of Positive
Psychology, 7, 3644. doi:10.1080/17439760.2011.626789
Romanus Cessario, O.P. (2009). The moral virtues and theological ethics (2nd ed.). Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame.
Salomon, R., Levy, D.R., & Malach, R. (2013). Deconstructing the default: Cortical subdivision of the
default mode/intrinsic system during self-related processing. Human Brain Mapping. doi:10.1002/
hbm.22268
Van Dam, N.T., Earleywine, M., & Borders, A. (2010). Measuring mindfulness? An item response theory
analysis of the mindful attention awareness scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 49, 805810.
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2010.07.020
Volkow, N.D., Wang, G.J., Telang, F., Fowler, J.S., Logan, J., Jayne, M., . . . & Wong, C. (2007). Profound
decreases in dopamine release in striatum in detoxified alcoholics: Possible orbitofrontal involvement.
Journal of Neuroscience, 27, 1270012706. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3371-07.2007
Way, B.M., Creswell, J.D., Eisenberger, N.I., & Lieberman, M.D. (2010). Dispositional mindfulness and
depressive symptomatology: Correlations with limbic and self-referential neural activity during rest.
Emotion, 10, 1224. doi:10.1037/a0018312
Religion, Brain & Behavior 47
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ow
lin
g G
ree
n S
U]
 at
 06
:41
 30
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
14
 
RESPONSE
Bridging the communication and cultural gap between the cognitive
sciences and the contemplative traditions
Patricia E. Sharp*
Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH, USA
Introduction
I want to thank the commentators for their thoughtful and thought-provoking
responses to this target article. Each has provided a perspective that has helped me
expand my knowledge and further refine my theoretical efforts.
A few general themes emerged across the set of commentaries, so I will focus
most of my responses on these, and I apologize for having omitted consideration of
some of the issues raised by single individuals.
Clarification of my hypotheses regarding meditation and brain processes
Much of the ensuing discussion will involve examination of my theoretical proposals
for how meditation may affect the brain. In particular, I presented two separate
hypotheses, and each involves a very specific aspect of Buddhist practice/experience,
as well as very specific postulated brain mechanisms.
Hypothesis for contentless consciousness as proposed in Sharp (2011)
In an earlier paper (Sharp, 2011), I provided a possible neural explanation for states
of deep concentration in which, eventually, all recognizable thoughts and perceptions
vanish. Within the Buddhist tradition, this state may be referred to as Samadhi or as
a series of stages known as the Jhanas. In these deep states one is said to reach pure
consciousness or substrate consciousness, in which all everyday perceptual categor-
ization and thought vanishes. In exchange for these more usual contents, there is a
sense of pure luminosity (Shankman, 2008).
In this earlier paper (Sharp, 2011), I pointed out that our day-to-day perceptual,
cognitive and mnemonic abilities are thought to depend on Hebbian synaptic
plasticity mechanisms, which create sets of strongly interconnected neurons that then
support pattern classification (perception), classical and instrumental conditioning,
episodic and semantic memory, and so on.
To explain how certain meditation practices may produce a mental state devoid
of all recognizable content, I suggested that certain biochemical processes possibly
evoked during these practices may disadvantage activity in these previously
conditioned attractor networks. In the limit, with no attractor activity anywhere
in the brain, there would be something closer to random, novel activity patterns.
I argued that this might correspond to the contentless, luminous states described in
the Buddhist literature.
*Email: psharp@bgsu.edu
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Hypothesis for blissful meditative experiences
In the target article under discussion here, I sought to provide a theoretical
possibility for how to explain the affective state of bliss, which is said to arise
frequently during concentrative practices such as Samadhi. For this, I focused on
the conditioned attractor states in only those brain regions that project directly to the
nucleus accumbens, and I further focused on only those attractors involving periodic
release of dopamine into the accumbens, and which, arguably, have thus become
repetitive covert behaviors that can be likened to addictions. I then point out that,
as for any addiction, it might be expected that repetition of these neural activity
patterns might be accompanied by conditioned down-regulation of dopamine
release, and the concomitant dysphoria and craving. Thus, a meditative state that
breaks up these particular attractor states might be expected to result in relative
euphoria.
Responses to reviewer comments
The collision between ancient meditative traditions and contemporary neuroscience can
sometimes be misleading and dangerous
Both Josipovic and Weber have correctly pointed out that the focus of the target
article may leave some readers with the impression that the overall goal of the
Buddhist path consists of simply learning to ‘‘joyride’’ on these blissful meditation-
induced states. I thank these commentators for making it clear that these meditative
traditions, in fact, warn against this form of ‘‘clinging,’’ and that these traditions
encompass a much broader set of psychological, philosophical, and ethical
considerations.
Spezio provides a more detailed critique of ways in which my theoretical
proposals fall short of capturing genuine and important aspects of traditional eastern
spiritual paths in general, as well as the bliss-inducing Jhana practice in particular.
He first points out that many scientific studies of religious phenomena fail to make
any reasonable connection with the genuine spiritual, philosophical or ethical
messages of the religious tradition itself. He repeats the warning issued elsewhere
(e.g., McNamara, Sosis, & Wildman, 2011) that this type of intellectual sloppiness
causes serious difficulties both ethically (it constitutes a disregard for and a
misrepresentation of the spiritual tradition) and in terms of the science itself.
Personally, as a devoted practicing Buddhist, I am very concerned about these
issues as well, and thus I am chagrinned to be taken to task, myself, for this very
failing. Consequently, I will do my best to defend my efforts with regard to this issue.
First, I might comment that in my experience during my few initial forays into
what is, for me, a new field (psychology of religion), I have found it extremely
difficult to publish anything related to Buddhism in any scientifically oriented
academic journal without first: (1) scrubbing the text clean of any vocabulary words
used within the religion itself (e.g., ‘‘bliss’’ should be changed to ‘‘positive affect’’);
(2) feigning indifference with regard to either the value system or value to humans
inherent in the tradition (unless accompanied by ‘‘scientific evidence’’ of this value);
and (3) pretending to be agnostic (at best) as to whether any of the spiritual,
philosophical, or psychological teachings within the tradition have any validity. Thus,
the two cultures (contemplative spiritual traditions versus contemporary biological
and social sciences) have different goals, different linguistic traditions, and different
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empirical techniques. This must explain at least part of the seeming disconnect
between the two in academic contexts, especially when this disconnect is generated
even by those who have one foot in each camp.
I find these restrictions within academic scientific venues quite troubling, and this
issue relates to the question, discussed elsewhere (Wildman & McNamara, 2008), as
to what the point (purpose or value) may be for any neural investigation of any
religious activity. I have made an effort to provide my own view on this question in
the closing paragraphs of the target article, and so I will not repeat myself here.
In relation to this issue, Spezio raises three specific criticisms of my approach. The
first of these is to question my assertion of the identity between ‘‘hedonic bliss’’
versus bliss induced during meditative absorption. If I understand it correctly, his
criticism here has to do with the fact that Samadhi and Jhana are complex constructs,
as described in the traditional teachings, and are thus unlikely to be identical with
euphoria that results from, for example, a hit of cocaine. In response I will say, first,
that my theoretical effort is aimed at explaining just the isolated phenomenal
presence of bliss itself. Indeed, I appreciate that the context in which this is embedded
during Jhana is very different from that of the worldly pleasures, and, in fact, this is
really my main point. With regard to the empirical question of whether the bliss itself
during Jhana versus that during consumption of worldly goods is similar, either
experientially or neurologically, I have given my best effort at addressing this issue in
the opening sections of the target article, and I will not repeat myself here.
However, it is worth noting that since the acceptance of this target article there
has appeared the first ever brain-imaging study of an adept meditator during the
specific practice of Jhana (Hagerty et al., 2013). These investigators examined several
regions of interest as the single subject underwent the full sequence of the eight stages
of Jhana meditation. The main research question was, in fact, whether the bliss
induced during certain stages of this practice was accompanied by activation of the
dopamine/opiate brain reward center (nucleus accumbens), which is also activated by
worldly rewards, and which was the focus of my target article. The results confirmed
a highly significant increase in BOLD (blood oxygen level-dependent) signal in
accumbens, compared to rest, during those stages of Jhana which were accompanied
by introspectively reported ‘‘ecstatic joy,’’, along with a concomitant, striking
decrease in activity in sensory, language, and personal orientation regions. Thus,
this recent study provides additional evidence for the possible identity of neural
processes involved in hedonic and meditative bliss.
The second specific issue raised by Spezio is that, in the Pali canon (thought by
many to be a transcription of the teachings of the Buddha himself, as recalled and
recounted by his closest followers), bliss during Samadhi is said to arise initially in
conjunction with discernment and concentration (vitakka-vicara), which are still
present in early stages of a meditation practice session. Since these thought processes
would presumably require co-activation in the subsets of neurons responsible for this
content, their coexistence with the arising of bliss would appear to contradict my
hypothesis that bliss results from the disruption of all attractor network activity.
In relation to this criticism, the sustainability of my hypothesized neural
mechanism for bliss depends on the answer to two questions. First, do these thoughts
(neural patterns) constitute well-worn patterns that cause periodic, predictable
dopamine release and that have been rehearsed often enough to have become genuine
attractors, as defined by having above average synaptic strength in the connections
between the involved neurons? The answer to this is critical, because the
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down-regulation of dopamine I propose would take place only in relation to well-worn
(over-conditioned) neural/thought patterns. According to the description of the early
Jhanas provided by Shankman (2008), it seems that, to the contrary, these speculative
philosophical thoughts would likely be novel ‘‘attainments,’’ such as philosophical
insights provided by the altered state of progressing mental quiescence. As described by
Shankman, the collection of thoughts that may take place during this time seems to be
somewhat of a grab-bag. However, Shankman is careful to point out that:
Vitakka-vicara should never be understood as thinking or musing in the ordinary sense.
The salient unifying feature unique to vitakka-vicara as Jhana factors is the function of
applying and sustaining the mind to its object, rather than just recognition that thinking
is present in the first jhana. (Shankman, 2008, p. 40)
If this is true, then the arising of bliss in the presence of such thoughts is compatible
with my hypothesis.
The second relevant question is whether any components of the neural circuits
involved in these thought processes are located in regions that project directly to the
nucleus accumbens. That is, even if the thoughts do, in fact, consist of repetitive
activity in well-developed attractors, this would be irrelevant to my hypothesis if
those attractors do not involve neural groups that project directly onto the
accumbens. The answers to the above two questions are critical to the support or
abandonment of the central hypothesis in my target article.
Spezio’s third criticism regarding infidelity to the authentic religious tradition has
to do with the fact that my hypothesis does not address the cognitive processes
involved in the development and expression of the ‘‘contemplative character.’’ He
points out that these would all be expressed using attractor networks. I agree that my
work does not address these issues, and I will discuss this further below.
The path toward enlightenment involves cognitive, attractor-based restructuring of
mind, in addition to the ‘luminous’, no-thought (no-attractor activation) states which
are central to my target article
Several of the commentators (Alcorta, Josipovic, and Spezio) have noted that the
Buddhist spiritual path does not involve simply getting rid of thoughts, but rather
involves a serious cognitive restructuring of thought, perception, and emotional
reactivity. This restructuring is based on insights developed from the teachings on
philosophy and psychology, as well as insights that arise during meditation itself. I
completely agree with this. I acknowledge that this restructuring involves reorganiza-
tion (rather than complete destruction) of the brain’s attractor networks, at least as
they exist during normal daily activities. Thus, I appreciate the reminder that
advanced meditators still have organized thoughts, perceptions, and actions when off
the meditation cushion, and that these are, of course, based, at least in part, on
attractor networks.
Shamatha-Vipashyana meditation
I would like to frame my comments on this issue around the very basic, beginner’s
Tibetan Buddhist meditation practice known as Shamatha-Vipashyana
(for an introduction to this practice, see Pema Chodron, 1994). Although
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Shamatha-Vipashyana is widely used for beginners, it is also said that this basic
practice is all that is needed to go all the way to enlightenment. Also, in my own
understanding, many Buddhist and Yogic practices involve, at their core, various
combinations of these same two processes (Shamatha and Vipashyana).
Shamatha (calming)
The instructions for Shamatha-Vipashyana begin with the direction to first take a
proper sitting pose, and then simply notice (for example) one’s own breath as it goes
in and out. The idea is to calm the mind by attending to a neutral object, so that the
usual frenetic pattern of thoughts and emotions will settle down. This calming due to
focus on a neutral object constitutes the Shamatha aspect of the practice. Ultimately,
when the practitioner develops skill at keeping the mind steady on the object, this
Shamatha transforms into deeper absorptive states that, in my understanding, would
then likely be referred to as Samadhi, in which all identifiable mental objects,
including the object of focus itself, disappear. It is this Shamatha (or Samadhi) aspect
of meditation that is relevant to my two hypotheses as stated above.
This process of Shamatha/Samadhi is often likened to the calming of the ocean.
When the waves (thoughts) are high, as during everyday discursive thinking, the
water is churned up and frothy, creating constantly changing, unpredictable patterns.
In this state it is impossible to see the true clear nature of the water. However, on a
calm day (as during Shamatha/Samadhi), the clear, luminous, formless nature of
water itself can be observed. In my earlier publication (Sharp, 2011) I replaced the
metaphor of waves in the ocean with the metaphor of attractor network activity in
the brain.
The commentators (Alcorta and Josipovic) have noted that brain-imaging studies
do not provide support for the idea that there is random brain activity during
meditation. Rather, there are specific increases of activity in some areas, while there
are systematic decreases in others, depending on the type of meditation. Also, studies
that look specifically at functional connectivity reveal that there may be systematic
changes in, but not disappearance of, patterns of connectivity, and that these are
dependent on the type of meditation employed (Josipovic, Dinstein, Weber, &
Heeger, 2011).
These comments raise a few important technical issues. First, as discussed below,
many of the relevant studies are conducted during Vipashyana-type meditation,
rather than Shamatha. Both of my hypotheses, as stated above, are relevant primarily
for successful Shamatha/Samadhi versions of meditation.
In addition, even when a Shamatha type of technique (focus on a neutral object)
is used for a study, it is not clear that my hypotheses would dictate that there be no
sign of any organized activity in a brain scan. First, it is unlikely that many studies
have used subjects who actually reach full Samadhi (complete absence of thought
and perception) during the brain-imaging session. Instead, it seems likely that
subjects obtain only partial calming of thoughts, and that, at a minimum, conscious
activity related to the object of focus (breath, mantra, etc.) used to reach the
no-thought state is still present. If so, this would predict increased brain activity in
regions that process the object, and this would be accompanied by decreases in areas
responsible for content that has, indeed, begun to drop out. Thus, if discursive
thoughts related to self and future plans have begun to be replaced by concentration
on, for example, the breath, then this would predict, as mentioned by Alcorta,
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increases in activity in interoceptive areas, such as the insula, with concomitant
decreases in the default mode network.
In addition, even if full Samadhi is reached, as it was, apparently, by the subject
used in a recent study mentioned above (Hagerty et al., 2013), there would still,
presumably, be some brain regions with higher activity levels than others, many of
which would be different from those during the selected baseline condition. Perhaps
the overall pattern would depend on static biological variables related to relative
vascularization and vegetative state maintenance. In fact, the Hagerty et al. study
revealed a very patchy set of cortical activation and deactivation clusters relative to
the rest condition, and the authors state that this is suggestive of ‘‘an overall pattern
of diffuse activation during jhana.’’ It is not clear whether this particular pattern of
patches would be reproducible, since these data were from a single session with a
single subject.
A final technical comment has to do with the level of resolution provided by
brain-imaging studies. Even the very impressive levels provided by recent develop-
ments in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technology do not provide
the level of resolution necessary to examine activity in the exact collections of
neurons that constitute individual attractor networks. For example, a set of pictures
of Barak Obama might be expected to activate various regions of the visual-
processing system (e.g., the fusiform face area), as well as various language and,
possibly, emotional centers. Pictures of Hillary Clinton would likely activate a similar
set of general regions, but would, nonetheless, likely involve a non-overlapping set of
particular neurons in at least some of these areas. Thus, any two pictures of Clinton
might involve certain attractor networks that would be similar or identical to each
other, yet very different from those in the same brain region activated by pictures of
Obama. An fMRI image could not necessarily resolve this difference. Thus, the
relative activity level of a given region, based on brain-imaging data, does not allow
for a determination of whether there is organized attractor activity.
Vipashyana (insight or mindfulness)
Students of meditation inevitably discover that it is extremely difficult to follow the
instructions (summarized above) for Shamatha meditation. That is, it turns out that
it is nearly impossible to clear the mind and simply rest the consciousness on a single
neutral object, especially during the early stages of training. Rather, thoughts and
reactive emotions inevitably arise. The Vipashyana component of the Tibetan
Shamatha-Vipashyana practice has to do with how to handle and learn from the
arising of these thoughts. The student is instructed simply to label these intrusions as
‘‘thinking’’ and return to the neutral object. There is also some brief and distanced
examination of these thoughts, and a great deal can be learned in this process. One
major insight that can arise is that all thoughts and emotions are inconsequential
conscious events like clouds in the sky or waves in the ocean.
As noted by Weber in his commentary, it is this second, Vipashyana (mind-
fulness) aspect of Buddhist meditative practice that is most frequently utilized (often
in a modified form) in clinical and other secular settings in the West. Indeed, many of
the studies cited in the commentaries involve this mindfulness aspect of the practice,
and so are not relevant to either of my above-mentioned hypotheses. Mindfulness
itself does not involve the absence of attractors and does not, to my knowledge,
induce states of bliss.
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I would postulate that it is within this Vipashyana aspect of the practice that
much of the organized cognitive restructuring referred to by the commentators may
take place. Indeed, Josipovic et al. (2011) have reported a restructuring of the usual
anti-correlation between brain regions involved in external, task-oriented processing
versus those involved in internal, self-related processing. This restructuring took
place specifically during a type of mindfulness meditation that Josipovic et al. refer to
as non-dual awareness (NDA). For this, the instructions were: ‘‘Rest in reflexive
NDA, equally aware of inside and outside of your body, allowing experiences to arise
and subside of their own accord.’’ The meditators in this condition were additionally
instructed to avoid allowing the focus to become exclusively on either internal or
external phenomena, and to avoid trying to keep one’s mind empty of thoughts and
feelings (see ‘‘Instructions to participants’’ in the methods section of Josipovic et al.,
2011). Thus, the functional connectivity between the usually anti-correlated external
versus internal based networks was induced during mindfulness meditation in which
the subjects were instructed to think of both internal and external events during the
same session.
The characterization of undirected thinking (mind-wandering or daydreaming) as
either dysfunctional and/or dysphoric is misleading
Several of the commentators (Josipovic, Klinger, and Spezio) have noted that I
mischaracterized mind-wandering by overstating the idea that this undirected
thinking is typically dysfunctional and dysphoric. I agree: I should have been
more careful and truer to the data in my overall presentation of mind-wandering. In
the discussion below I acknowledge this misrepresentation of the data but will also
defend the Buddhist view that these tendencies play a negative role overall.
The most detailed presentation of this issue was provided by Klinger, and in the
following list I will provide a summary of each of his main points, along with my own
response.
(1) The mind-wandering typical during the brain’s default state is present during
3050% of our waking hours and so must be adaptive.
This argument is an example of adaptationism. According to this idea, every trait
exhibited by members of a species can be viewed as a separable unit that has been
fostered through a relatively independent process of natural selection. Of course, this
adaptationist view has been widely criticized, at least since the seminal ‘‘spandrels’’
paper by Gould and Lewontin (1979). This points out that a given trait may exist not
due to a natural selection process, but rather as a consequence of historical events,
along with an overall set of traits that have, in fact, been acted on through natural
selection processes.
Thus, in the case of mind-wandering, we might first consider that humans possess
a combination of (a) remarkable abilities for mental time travel, (b) highly developed
language-based storytelling abilities, and (c) a dopamine reward system (that can be
activated by the covert neural activity involved in (a) and (b); see Sulzer et al., 2013).
It could be that our tendency to frequent mind-wandering may simply be a
consequence of this combination of traits (each of which is presumably adaptive),
and may not have been acted on independently through natural selection. As such,
mind-wandering may, nonetheless, have at least some beneficial consequences
(as referenced by the commentators), but it cannot be assumed to be adaptive
overall, or to be optimally adaptive.
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(2) Mind-wandering is connected with the pursuit of personal goals and is helpful in
this pursuit. It serves as a continual reminder mechanism for the complete agenda of
short-term and long-term goals.
One point I had hoped to emphasize in the target paper is the remarkable
correspondence between recent insights from cognitive neuroscience and those of
Buddhist psychology in relation to the human tendency constantly to mentally drift
from the present moment into a stream of transient, discursive thoughts related to an
ongoing narrative about self and self-related goals. Both traditions agree that this is a
central feature of human existence.
However, it seems that the two traditions are quite opposite in how they value
these tendencies. Indeed, the Buddhist teachings agree that much of our offline
mental activity is in the service of our external, online task-oriented behavior.
However, in the Buddhist system such preoccupation with these goals is viewed as
addictive and undesirable. They readily acknowledge that both daydreams and
external achievement of goals provide momentary gratifications, and can allow for
successful acquisition of necessary food, shelter, safety, and so on. They caution,
however, that the constant obsession with self-image and self-service may also cause
aggression, paranoia, fear, and a host of additional negative emotions that lead to
relative unhappiness for the individual and for the larger community.
Buddhist teachings promise that renunciation of striving for worldly goals leads
to freedom of thought and action, compassion and kindness toward others, and
unshakable happiness for the individual. They also promise that, as mentioned by
Weber in his commentary, there will actually be a superior ability to think through
problems and solutions on the spot, when necessary, so that goods essential for well-
being can be obtained.
In relation to point (1) above on the adaptive value of mind-wandering, it could
be noted that practices of meditation and renunciation are observed in many
different cultures. Thus, we could also raise the question as to whether these
meditative practices are adaptive, and whether these, too, have been acted on through
processes of natural selection. This may be an interesting empirical question.
However, it is important to remember that from the Buddhist perspective,
survival is not necessarily a central goal. In fact, Buddhist teachers encourage
students to give up on their own survival. Thus, the ancient Buddhists were lacking a
Darwinian line of thought, which might have surreptitiously served as a value
system, rather than just an explanatory framework. Accordingly, it is possible that
meditative and renunciative practices may constitute a spandrel that is not, in fact
adaptive.
(3) There is not good support for the idea that mind-wandering induces negative affect.
I appreciate the more careful look at the data on this subject prompted by Klinger’s
comments. One useful clarification of my own thinking here is that, from the
Buddhist point of view, there is no prediction that mind-wandering would be more
dysphoric than many of the comparison (on-task) activities used in the relevant
studies. Many on-task behaviors would also likely involve self-presentation and
promotion and so be equally problematic from the Buddhist view. Again, the
Buddhist teachings readily acknowledge the gratifications available based on our
typical goal-driven activities and thoughts. They also assert, however, that far greater
happiness is available when these are relinquished. This suggests that future studies
should employ (successful) concentrative meditation as a comparison condition for
mind-wandering.
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(4) Mind-wandering is not addictive. Individuals who engage in extensive daydreaming
may well be, nonetheless, successful and mentally healthy.
According to Koob and Volkow, drug addiction is characterized by: (1) compulsion
to seek and take the drug; (2) loss of control in limiting intake; and (3) emergence of
a negative emotional state reflecting a motivational withdrawal syndrome.
Mind-wandering is somewhat difficult to assess in relation to points (1) and (2),
since it is a covert behavior and is readily available based on resources inherent
within the individual. However, distraction from performance of directed tasks that
require devoted attention could provide one measure. Klinger’s point that many avid
fantasizers are also successful both professionally and in family life does indicate
that, if there are addictive aspects to this behavior, they are at least not overwhelming
in most cases.
However, recall that beginners at Shamatha meditation typically find it impossible
to focus the mind even briefly on a single neutral object. This suggests that it is,
indeed, difficult to withhold mind-wandering, at least in the absence of an alternative
equally engaging task. Also, Buddhist teachings claim that reasoning and problem-
solving abilities are superior for highly attained practitioners for whom mind-
wandering in daily life has subsided. If this Buddhist claim is true, it suggests that
daydreams may intrude even when an individual appears to be on task. Thus, closer
empirical examination is necessary to assess whether addiction-like mechanisms may
be active in relation to mind-wandering.
With regard to Koob and Volkow’s third point (negative affect during with-
drawal), the Buddhist teachings do not, to my knowledge, document any withdrawal
syndrome, as observed during prolonged withdrawal from drugs of abuse. This could
be due to the fact that sustained withdrawal from mind-wandering develops only
very gradually over a long time for the typical practitioner, and so the expected
withdrawal symptoms may not be observable. Alternatively, this could indicate
important differences between mind-wandering versus addictive processes.
Klinger also mentions that it is hard to explain rumination on negative thoughts
as being addictive. Of course, one possibility is to suggest that instances of negative
reinforcement are embedded in these thought processes, so that they are reinforced
even though they continue to be an overall negative experience. Consideration of this
possibility involves complexities beyond the scope of this discussion.
The involvement of the insula in meditative practice
Two of the commentators (Alcorta and Schachter) have noted that the anterior
insula may play a critical role both during and as a long-term result of meditation.
Activation of this area has been observed during meditation in some studies, and the
insula shows greater thickness and gyration in long-time meditators (although
longitudinal studies are required to assess the significance of such comparative data).
In particular, both Alcorta and Schachter have suggested that increases in excitatory
input from the insula to the nucleus accumbens may explain the euphoria sometimes
induced by either meditation or pathological seizures. This process could well provide
an alternative to the dopamine disinhibition hypothesized in my target article.
One question I would have with regard to the involvement of the insula would be
whether this depends on the type of meditation employed. For example, many forms
of meditation involve concentration on the breath as it moves within various
components of the body. These types of meditation might be expected to activate the
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insula, since this region receives interoceptive inputs. One test between the proposed
insular activation of the accumbens versus my proposed dopamine disinhibition
would be to examine both introspectively reported bliss as well as measured
dopamine release during absorptive meditation sessions that variably engage the
insula (as judged by both brain-scanning evidence and introspective content).
Ecstasy during seizures may share commonalities with ecstatic experiences during
meditation
I thank Schachter for drawing my attention to the phenomenon of ecstatic seizures.
This is yet another example of euphoria that occurs in the absence of any external
reward substance and that can take on a spiritual significance. The evidence again
suggests possible accumbens involvement. It will be interesting perhaps one day to
learn whether this has to do with the blockade of usual input patterns to the
accumbens, or whether it is due more to direct accumbens stimulation.
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